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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the
collapse

of the socialist-Communist system in Eastern Europe
and in

the Soviet Union, three countries from the former Warsaw

bloc gained worldwide attention to their transitions to

democratic systems. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary

established democratic regimes shortly after their peaceful
transformations in the fall of 1989. Over

a

period of nearly

three years, the model of a liberal, west European type of

democracy with free market capitalism has been these
countries' guideline for creating more prosperous nations.

Eastern Europe swept aside the former systemic antagonism
that existed between democracy and communism and is moving

towards

integration within the western world.

This process raises parallels to recent European

history. Merely twenty years ago, Portugal and Spain sought

their post-authoritarian future within the European
Community. In various aspects the Iberian nations

experienced problems similar to those currently existing in
Eastern Europe. Their economies were inefficient and were
forced to undertake an intensive process of modernization in
order to achieve competitive standards. With the advent of

democracy and capitalism, the people were confronted with
change of their traditional way of life. Values and
1

a

attitudes shifted due to the implementation of

liberal

a

political system. The Iberian societies suffered
from
decades of authoritarian rule. The democratic roots
among

people and institutions were shallow. A democratic
commitment from elites and citizens, and

a

variety of

democratic associations and interest groups had to be

developed
The similarities to the current situation in Eastern

Europe are evident and therefore suggest

a

comparative

analysis. This study tries to draw conclusions for the

political processes in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
by trying to use the experiences of the two Iberian nations
as useful examples and a model for the Eastern European

transition towards democracy.
The research concentrates on the process of

establishing the new democratic regimes on

a

firm and

permanent basis. Among various aspects which are essential
to implement a stable democracy, the focus will be

exclusively on two significant threats: civil-military
relations and the requirement of

a

new security concept.

Due to its potency in terms of manpower and the use of
force,

the military apparatus represents a potential threat

to any political regime. Thus, the integration of the

military into democratic society and the establishment of
civil supremacy constitutes an essential task for Eastern

Europe in order to reduce the internal risk of
2

a

military

coup and a return to authoritarian rule.
The research tries
to develop a normative concept of civil-military
relations
in a democratic system and asks,

in what ways have the

Eastern European nations succeeded or failed so far,
by
showing parallels to the Iberian cases.
Security threats impose

further risk for the

a

democratic transition. External threats, such as possible
challenges to the countries' geographical boundaries, border

violations or refugee problems arose from the civil wars on
the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the general

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the rapid but yet highly

unpredictable changes in the republics of the former Soviet
Union

With the implementation of democracy and capitalism,
various internal threats, such as

a

discontent with the

political system, the economic situation or ethnic tensions
are potential sources for instability. The study intends to

illustrate the various threats and possible capacities to

diminish or control them, set against the situation in Spain
and Portugal during their transitions.

The developments after autumn 1989 ended the forty-year

long division of Europe and the antagonism of two opposing

societal and economic ideologies. History offers Europe

a

unique chance: the unification and integration of east and
west. Western outside powers have a key-position in this

3

process due to their economic and financial
capacities and
the function of the west-European type of
democracy
as a

role-model for the new regimes.
Poland,

Hungary and Czechoslovakia are reducing state

expenditures and controls, privatizing state-industries
and
lifting restrictions on trade and investment. The political
system pursues

a

democratic path with the formation of

a

pluralist party-system and the introduction of free
elections and democratic local and federal authorities.
These processes, however, cause hardship and provoke

political resistance from those who depended on state

protection and profited from the communist regime. The
transformation from communism to democracy represents an
economically as well as socio-polit ically unique historical
case.

If those experiments fail,

regimes,

a

return to authoritarian

including oppression of minorities, threats against

the western world and waves of immigrants will almost be

certain
The recent example of Lithuania shows that the path

towards democracy is far from being secured against

authoritarian setbacks. In November 1992, the Lithuanian
voters,

confronted with severe economic difficulties

repudiated the Sajudis movement that brought them
independence. Instead,

given

a

a

party of former communists was

working majority in

a

new Parliament.

4

Fostering democracy in Eastern Europe is
therefore not
only a moral duty but furthermore strategically
logical.
Democratic countries do not go to war with each
other or
sponsor terrorism. Democratic countries are more
reliable
and open trading partners and offer more stable
investment
opportunities. Democratic countries respect civil liberties,
rights of property and justice and are therefore
more

reliable partners to build a safer and more prosperous

Europe based on peace and cooperation.
Therefore, the concluding part of the study tries to

demonstrate where help, advice and guidance by western
powers is needed. How can western powers assist and even
foster the integration process of the Eastern European

militaries? How can they support the development of

a

new

security concept to counterbalance the various threats?
The study focuses on the particular outside powers of

the European Community,

its individual member states as well

as the United States. Again,

the cases of Spain and Portugal

serve as a comparative base, trying to illustrate when and

under what circumstances western powers offered helpful

assistance or disclosed detrimental failures.

When thinking of the democratization processes in

Southern Europe in the 1970'

one might ask why Greece is

s,

not included in this study. This country also freed itself

from authoritarian rule in the mid-1970's. Greece

5

experienced

a

revolution from above. The military apparatus

-the key power-holder of the system- initiated
the

transformation;

process comparable to that of Eastern

a

Europe where reformist factions of the communist
parties

started the democratization. Also, as in the cases of
Poland,

Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Greece viewed the

European Community as

a

safeguard for the establishment of

democracy, as well as for social and economic enhancement.
But on the other side, the Greek experience with

authoritarian rule was simply too short to be valid for
comparative study. In the years following World War
the German occupation the country suffered from
In 1949 however,

a

II

a

and

civil war.

the communist forces were defeated and the

constitutional monarchy and

a

parliamentary system was

reestablished. The military regime lasted only for seven
years. In the period between 1967 and 1974 the colonels

hardly managed to institutionalize authoritarianism and
failed to consolidate their power.

1

After the coup,

democratic attitudes, values, and practices were far from

being erased from the Greek society. This was

a

advantage for the democratization of Greece and

decisive
a

clear

distinction from Eastern Europe, where societies were shaped
and dominated by forty-five years of Communism, with people

being deeply affected by authoritarian rule.

1

Harry Psomiades,

1982,

p.251
6

In Eastern Europe two generations
grew up without

having any form of democratic experience. A
tight
ideological framework and a complex security
apparatus

dominated the individual and streamlined entire
societies.
Thus,

the building of a new democratic society is
far more

complicated in such an environment. Democratic values,
forms
of participation,

simple cognitive aspects of pluralism need

to evolve. People have to learn to participate in the

transformation to

a

new system. This lack of democratic

knowledge was not present in the case of Greece.

7

CHAPTER II
THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION

A.

The Research Agenda

For a stable democracy the integration of the
military

apparatus into the society and its subordination to

a

democratic executive is of vital importance. As Samuel

Huntington noted, the military is shaped by two forces:

2

a

functional imperative represented in the paramount task of

maintaining the nation's security and
where social forces,
the apparatus

.

a

societal imperative

ideologies and institutions influence

The interaction of these two forces are the

nucleus of civil— military relations. Various theoretical
aspects on this relation need to be mentioned.

1.

Structural Antagonism
Structural problems between the armed forces and

a

liberal-democratic society are manifold. According to
Huntington, the military emphasizes the importance of the

group as opposed to the individual. The efficiency of the

military requires the subordination of the individual. 3 The
core problem here is that the organization of the military

apparatus follows

a

2

Samuel Huntington,

3

see:

strictly hierarchical "top-down" pattern
1957,

Samuel Huntington,

p.2
1957,
8

p.63

m

order to maintain its combat capability.
The individual
soldier has to obey orders and the organization
has to keep
a high level of discipline to be
effective. This contradicts
the liberal attitudes of a democracy which
emphasizes the
self expression, primacy and value of the
individual. Thus,
the individual soldier has to learn to separate
his role of
citizen from that of soldier, while the overarching
military

apparatus needs to provide the disciplinary frame.
Furthermore, to maintain the standard of an effective
army,

the military needs to develop a certain amount of

integrity. Huntington's imperative of the military's

professionalism

4

(see II. A.

requires autonomy for the

3)

apparatus to fulfill its purpose. Certain functions (see
II. A. 3)

have to be performed exclusively by the military

without any civil intervention. The tendency and danger of
the formation of a state within a state is obvious. The

military's emphasis on obedience and loyalty, fostered by
its hierarchical structure and generated by its professional

function has the capability to form peculiar attitudes,
values and standards which do not necessarily reflect those
of the rest of the democratic society.
In addition,

the apparatus has

limited outlook on politics.

5

a

practical as well as

The military mind is more

concerned with military capabilities of other states than
4

see:

Samuel Huntington,

1957,

pp.83

5

see:

Samuel Huntington,

1957,

pp.64

9

a

with their political intentions. Its
focus is on the
relation between political goals and military

means, because

this directly affects security matters,
which represent the
raison d'etre of the armed forces. This
paramount concern
with national security results in the quest for
the

strengthening of forces or budget increases
Finally,

the military has several advantages over civil

organizations. According to S.E. Finer 6 the military is

a

highly organized institution due to its centralized
command,
its hierarchical structure,

its discipline and its esprit de

corps. Especially in changing societies,

such as those in

Eastern Europe, the military is often the best organized and
most disciplined organization

7
.

The superiority to other

organizations is further enhanced by the military's monopoly
on arms and its superiority in the means of applying force.

2.

Civil-Military Tensions
These structural contrasts between the civilian and the

military sector can under certain circumstances generate
into severe tensions and can impose a vital threat to the

political system. The conditions for this are as follows:

6

7

S.E. Finer,

1976,

pp

.

Constantine Danopoulos,

1988,
10

p.6

First,

cognitive change on how the military views
its
own position in society: according to
Amos Perlmutter, 8
a

a

feeling of inferiority can be caused by

a

defeat in war, by

growing marginality of the military profession
and
general decline in the reputation of the officer
a

a

status or

due to an apprehension that the civilian sector
and

politicians intend to bring change to the military
organization and its status, which either pander to or
injure its pride as an autonomous organization.
Second,

the economic status of the individual soldier

plays a decisive role. Skepticism towards

a

democratic

system is increased if the civilian sector is unable to

provide food and housing. As seen in the case of the German

Reichswehr

,

personal material security is often

a

reigning

concern among soldiers. In 1930, two junior officers were

convicted of distributing Nazi propaganda material among
fellow soldiers which was strictly forbidden by the

Reichswehr military code. One of the accused published his
motives
"The need for earning bread becomes all-important.
Soldiers turn into officials, officers become
candidates for pensions". 9

8

Amos Perlmutter,

9

in:

S.E.

Finer,

1977,
1976,

p.35
p.51
11

A further example represents the current
situation of the
Red Army of the former Soviet Union. 10
The departure of
forces from the Eastern European countries,
the eastern part
of Germany and the Baltic republics
is hampered by the

problem of providing housing or alternative jobs
for those
affected by reduction measures. A political system
which is
not able to provide a decent economic standard
for the

soldier is likely be confronted with pressure from the

apparatus

11
.

Third,

sector,

the apprehension of either military or civil

that the other side is doing an unacceptable job in

securing national interests: tension can arise over such
issues as mismanagement of military matters, a denial of

resources or civilian interference in military decision
making.

12

Also,

the military might be forced to intervene

in politics due to governmental failure.

Corruption or

political disorder serve as examples. 13

see:

Serge Schmemann: "The Red Army fights a Rearguard
Action against History",
in: New York Times, March 29, 1992, p.E4

11

These cognitive and economic intentions can be further
classified into various motives, such as class interest,
regional aspects, individual or corporate self-interest of
the army. For a more detailed discussion see:
S.E. Finer, 1975, p.20-53.

12

see:

13

Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9

Timothy Colton,

1990,

p.9

12

3.

Objective Civilian Control and Professionalism

How can a civilian supremacy over
the military sector an essential for a democratic systembe established? Samuel
Huntington discussed varieties of civilian
control. 14
He

opposed the concept of subjective civilian
control which
entails the maximizing of civilian power. The
diversity,

varied character and conflicting interests of
various
civilian groups would make it impossible to raise
civilian

power as

a

whole as opposed to the military. According to

Huntington this idea would result in the maximizing of
power
of certain civilian groups exalting in the supremacy
of

"particular governmental institutions, particular social
classes and particular constitutional forms". 15 In
addition, the civilian supremacy would be guaranteed by

civilisnizing the military due to

a

denial of an independent

sphere for the armed forces.

But this qualitative enlargement of civilian control

and the reduction of military power could result in an

ineffective army and could undermine military security.
Thus,

Huntington favors the concept of an objective civilian

control. Here,

instead of civilianizing, the military would

be militarized, by maximizing its professionalism. This can

be accomplished by a clear delineation between political and
14

Samuel Huntington,

1957,

p.80-83

15

Samuel Huntington,

1957,

p.81
13

military roles, which would result in the
military's
devotion to strictly military matters. It would
preserve the
essential function of the army, increase military
security,

and furthermore subordinate the military
under civilian

supremacy by reducing its power "to the lowest
level vis-avis all civilian groups". 16
For Huntington, military professionalism consists
of

expertness,

social responsibility, which includes

information and advice to its client

(i.e.the state)

and a

corporate identity. 17 Like other professions, the military
develops its own identity and corporate unity due to its
unique task. This represents the solution for Huntington to

establish

a

civil supremacy. The more the soldier is engaged

in his own technical realm,

such as maintaining

a

combat-

capability, technical handling of equipment, recruiting and
training, the less he is likely to get involved in policy

issues which do not directly affect him.

Huntington's concept however has significant
limitations. As Timothy Colton 18 pointed out, the concept
of professionalism cannot be precisely defined. Thus,

military professionalism and its special tasks vary from
culture to culture. Also
16

Samuel Huntington,

17

see:

18

in:

p.85

1957,

Samuel Huntington,

Timothy Colton,

professional army does not

a

1957,

1990,

p.8
14

p.8

automatically produce efficiency. Furthermore,
the military
and civilian realm are not neatly separated.
The provision
and design of equipment and the proper handling
later

on for

instance requires a cooperation between civil and
military
institutions. In addition, civilian organizations exist

which are also interested in national security. Intelligence
services or academia are such institutions that influence
the security agenda of

a

country.

Furthermore, recent history provides an example of

a

highly professional army, -The German Reichswehr- which

intervened heavily in politics during the era of the Weimar
Republic.

19

The treaty of Versailles limited the Reichswehr

to a size of 100,000 men. This fostered the development of a

highly organized, disciplined, autonomous, and effective
body.

Its interference in politics was consistent,

driven by

an anti-socialist and anti-democratic creed. These attitudes

made especially junior officers receptive to Nazi-

propaganda. In 1923 and on several occasions from 1930
onwards, the army was in fact ruling Germany. Several

Presidents took advantage of Article 48 of the Constitution,

which gave the Head of State the authority to establish
personal government in

a

a

the State of Emergency, backed by

military force. The "Reichswehr" showed that the provision
of an autonomous realm and military professionalism alone

are not sufficient to establish civil supremacy.
19

for detailed information see: S.E. Finer,
15

1976,

p.26-53

Finally,

according to S.E. Finer 20

professionalism tends towards

a

,

military

collision with the civilian

sector. A highly professional military regards
itself more
as a servant to the state rather than to the
government. The

corporate identity and self-consciousness of the
apparatus
generates its own values and criteria for the notion of
national interest. The controversy between General MacArthur
and President Truman over the American involvement during
the Korean War serves as a classic example. This attitude

results in the perception that only the army is competent to
judge on military matters. An intervention of civilian

politicians in this realm can raise tensions, due to the

military's perception that the civil sector went beyond its
limits and competence.

Thus,

the concept of objective civilian control and

military professionalism, whose primary goal is an effective
but politically less influential army, cannot by itself

establish civilian supremacy. Huntington's concept is not
the sole factor that inhibits the military from

intervention. Apart from this material aspect of civil
supremacy,

from a clear definition of duties, authorities,

and responsibilities for both the civilian and the military
sector,

20

the "military must also have absorbed the principle

for a more detailed discussion on these aspects see:
S.E. Finer, 1975, p.21-23
16

of the supremacy of the civil power". 21
Not only from a
formal, but also from a cognitive point
of view must the

apparatus accept civilian rule.

—

The Civil-M ilitary Relation: Formal Aspects

How can the civil-military relation be organized
to

provide for the establishment of

stable democratic system?

a

As far as the functions of the military is concerned,

Huntington's concept of objective civilian control and

professionalism is valid. 22 Therefore, apart from being the
guarantor of national security, the military should provide
information and advice on military matters and has
furthermore an executive function in implementing state
decision. The military represents

a

purposive instrument,

with the task and commitment to serve the state. As

mentioned above, the military should be guaranteed

a

certain

autonomy in strictly military matters to maintain its combat
capability. This autonomy includes military training,
recruitment, and maneuvers.
The functions of the civilian sector are as followed:

Not too many civilian levels are to be found above the

general staff. However, in order to maintain an effective
functioning, civilians should have the decisive powers. This
21

S.E. Finer,

22

see:

1975,

p.24

Samuel Huntington,

1957,
17

pp.72

must include approval of the general
strategic and tactic
doctrines, decisions to go on/off alert and
to begin/end a
war,

setting of the budget, and ratification of
military

law
In addition,

further civilian checks on the military

can become necessary in order to prevent the
development of
a

state within the state. Such measures could include
the

creation of

a

general civilian inspectorate of the army or

an office that should be responsible for complaints,

-both

of civilians as well as military individuals- and of the

compliance with civil rights and the military law. This

measure was taken by West Germany and helped to control and
integrate

a

military with

a

long authoritarian past into the

new democratic society.
Civilian politicians should also retain

a

"military

personnel role, reserving the right to select most senior
officers and to review appointments at lower levels". 23 In
addition, every soldier should be forbidden to run for any

political post to prevent double functions of political and

military assignments. This is

a

vital element for the

reduction of an internal threat represented by the military.
The apparatus should not be able to influence political

decisions apart from its own realm. The superiority of the

civilian sector has to be paramount.

23

Timothy Colton,

1990,

p.9
18

5_;

,

The Civil-Military Relati o n: Cognitive
Aspspi- r

But legal and formal aspects do not
represent the
entire concern
the principle of civil supremacy. As

m

discussed above, several factors can generate
civil-military
tensions, including first an economic stringency,
second an
alienation of the armed forces from society,
third an
inappropriate governmental behavior in handling
sensitive
and military-related issues, and fourth the
mutual

perception of both sectors, that the other side operates
in
an insufficient way.

The economic performance of the newly emerged

democracies remains crucial to the support and commitment to

democracy of any societal group, not only the military. This
vital aspect will be further elaborated in chapter III.
As for the aspect of an alienated army it becomes

obvious, that the military complex is in need of

new

a

ideological base. Although its authority was curtailed by
the former communist regimes

had

a

(see II. B),

the military still

clear perspective of its duties. But for

to a stable democracy,

a

transition

the military apparatus needs to get

an entirely new function and responsibility. The apparatus
now,

after the collapse of the former ideology and the

regime which it was reared to serve, has to redefine its
role as a servant to democracy,

integrated within

pluralist society and under civilian rule.

19

a

But the adaptation to a new mode
of politics in a

democratic society is not one-sided. The
civilian sector
needs to acknowledge that the armed forces
are an integral
part of the democratic system. Its vital
function
as a

guarantor for the national security gives the
military an
important position in the establishment of democracy.
The

sector needs to establish

a

notion of respect and

acceptance of the autonomous realm of the armed forces in

military matters. In the former communist countries of
Eastern Europe, the military was clearly dominated by the
civil sector,

(see II. B.)

and its autonomy was often

relinquished for civil intervention.

Formal and legal aspects can channel the civil-

military relation in the political routine of day to day
procedures. Formality however must be accompanied by

a

democratic attitude and the conviction that the existence of
both sectors as well as their cooperation are essential for
the establishment of democracy. Only with this cognitive

base is it possible to keep eventual civil-military tensions
on a level which still allows for political,

solutions

20

non-violent

B^,

The Mil itary Apparatus in Eastern Europe

What is the nature of the civil-military
relation in a
communist system and in particular in the
former communist
countries of Eastern Europe? For many years
the dominant
explanatory model for civil-military relations
in communist
countries has been a "totalitarian" approach,
whereas the
party rigorously dominated the military with
terror and

purges

24

In recent studies on the Soviet Union however,

scholars addressed the increasing role of the apparatus
in
the decision making process. Although excluded and
isolated

from politics under Stalin, the military emerged into

a

legitimate interest group in the "golden age" of Soviet

civil-military relations under Brezhnev. 25 In addition,
although Gorbachev's policies gave priority to consumer
goods and civil technology, Glasnost still contributed to
the break up of military isolation from politics. 26
But the Soviet civil-military relations are not

universally transferable to every communist system. The
various degrees of authority and influence in such countries
as Cuba or the former Yugoslavia under Tito indicate that

general Soviet patterns are not necessarily valid for

Eastern Europe

see:

Jonathan Adelmann,

see:

Timothy Colton,

see:

Thane Gustafson,

1982,

1990,

1990,

p.2

p.19-29
pp.358
21

However,

the military in Eastern Europe was
heavily

influenced by the Soviet hegemony in the
communist bloc.
Military training and equipment had been
standardized under
Soviet supervision. 27 The military doctrine
of the Soviet
Union had over the years an increasing impact
on Eastern
Europe, for its forces represented a vital
element in the
case of a military confrontation in Europe with
NATO. Thus,
the military capacities and the presence of Soviet
divisions

constantly improved.
Furthermore, the aggressive Brezhnev Doctrine showed
that the Soviet Union was determined to prevent autonomous

national policies. The Damocles sword of

a

military

intervention of Soviet troops in internal affairs was always

hanging over the Eastern European countries.
A closer look however at recent historical events
indicates

a

critical relationship between the Soviet Union

and Eastern Europe. As noted by Dale R. Herspring, various

incidents showed that Eastern European militaries sometimes
were reluctant and counteractive to Soviet policies. 28 The

militaries of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia sought for
their own identities apart from being satellites for their
27

see: Ross Johnson,

28

Dale Herspring, 1989, p.133-143
During the "Prague Spring" in 1968 Hungarian and Polish
troops showed little enthusiasm for the police action of
the Pact-forces. In Poland in the 1980's, despite the
imposition of martial law and the Solidarity movement, the
military remained mostly neutral. In Hungary in 1956, some
Hungarian units fought against Soviet troops.

1978,

p.258
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powerful "brother". Bilateral and sometimes
trilateral
cooperation among Eastern European armies
increased

in the

1970

whereas the Soviet Union was only minimally
involved. 29 These events generated a skeptical
attitude of
the Soviet Union towards its alliance
partners with a
's

continued concern over Eastern Europe's loyalty
and the
stability of its forces.
Also,

the historic conditions for Eastern Europe in

establishing communist regimes differ sharply from that
of
the Soviet Union. The communist system in the Soviet
Union
emerged out of

revolution and the Red Army was shaped into

a

an effective body during the civil war. On the contrary,

the

communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary

suffered from

a

lack of support among the population.

Furthermore, the creation of a legitimate and effective army
in all three countries would have been a long process 30 due

to the need to incorporate various groupings with different

political backgrounds of

a

non-communist past. 31

29

Dale Herspring,

30

see: Andrzej Korbonski,

31

In Poland the following groupings had to be integrated:
- the Soviet-led Polish army founded in the USSR

1989,

p.139
1982,

-

p.121

the Communist armed underground; the People's Army
the non-communist armed underground; the Home Army
members of the prewar Polish Army released from German
captivity
- members of the Polish army in the West who decided to
return to Poland after the war
in: Andrzej Korbonski, 1982, p.110
23

These differing historic conditions
imposed various
consequences on the Eastern European militaries.
First, the
skepticism of the Soviet Union towards its
WTO partners
resulted in a low standard of equipment among
Eastern
European forces, 32 while better weapons went
to other

regions such as the Middle East. 33 Therefore,
the Eastern
European regimes had to rely on the Soviet Union
for their
external security due to the lack of capable and
effective
armies

34
.

Second,

the distrust of the regimes towards the

military in terms of its political conformity with the
communist ideology resulted in
by secret police forces.

35

a

penetration and

a

control

The military apparatus was far

During the development of the new armed forces in
Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948, the officer corps
was extremely heterogeneous: Some communist sources even
lamented the "bourgeois" nature of the new cadre,
in: Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.131
In Hungary the organizers of the newly communist army had
severe problems in finding political reliable but also
well trained officers. The regime tried to circumvent the
personnel shortage by establishing a system of dual
controls which placed a political officer next to a
military commander,
in: Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.150

see: Dale Herspring,

1989,

p.144-146

33

Ross Johnson,

34

see

Jonathan Adelmann,

1982,

35

see

Jonathan Adelmann,

1982,

1978,

p.262
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p.ll

oo

from being an autonomous actor,
it was in fact under civil
domination of the Communist party. The
civil supremacy was
absolute with the effect of an isolation
of the military
from the decision making process. 36
In conclusion,

the authority of the Eastern European

military was limited in two ways. On one side,
the domestic
regimes curtailed its autonomy on the national

level. On the

other side, the Soviet hegemony in the WTO
provided for a
further restriction. The lack of identity and
an ideological

base was evident. In defending their countries,
the regimes

relied on an outside power

- the

Soviet Union. Furthermore,

the armies found themselves neglected actors in the

Political process, almost alienated from the political
system. Thus,

an ideological identity was to a large extent

non-existent
This non-identity can now represent a positive factor
for the establishment of democracy. Now it is by far easier

for the Eastern European countries to develop a new

ideological base. Instead of being involved and integrated
into

a

military bloc, controlled and dictated by

superpower and an aggressive

(Brezhnev)

a

doctrine, the

Eastern European militaries now can redefine their function
in serving their own countries.

reemergence of national pride,

The possibility of a
a

notion of independence,

makes the militaries responsive to changes within the
36

Jiri Valenta,

1982,

p.129
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countries. The idea of change is
paramount. The transitions
to democratic regimes provide these
changes, making the
militaries receptive.

Again,

a

further remark on the importance of the

economic aspect seems appropriate. Although
the Eastern
European militaries support the creation of new

societies,

the amount of energy and approval of the
democratization

processes will largely depend on

a

material security.

Without it, the current positive attitude towards the
change
can turn into disappointment and a search for new
concepts.

1

.

Poland

Following the presidential elections in December 1990
and the parliamentary elections

a

year later, Poland

implemented various measures to establish

a

democratic

civilian rule over the armed forces and to reduce the

military threat to society.
Poland reduced its forces and equipment. 37 The
government emphasized the conversion to produce civilian
37

In the past three years,

the Polish armed forces have been
constantly reduced. After a reduction of 33,000 soldiers in
1989, the overall strength in 1990 amounted to 314,000 men,
108,000 of them professional Reductions for 1990 included
450 tanks, 200 guns and mortars and 100 armored transports;
in: Harold Orenstein, 1990, p.66
In June 1991 the overall strength was 305,000 men (114,000
professionals);
in: Europa, 1992, Vol.II, p.2250
.

26

goods. The anticipated annual tank
production for instance,
for the years 1991 until 1995 is expected
to amount to only
thirty,

as compared to a production capacity of
250.

In terms of institutional arrangements,

the President

is the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces and is also the

head of the National Defense Committee that directs
the
military in peace time. The Ministry of National
Defense

executes the directives given to it by the Defense
Committee.

38

On the governmental level two new civilian

vice ministers of defense, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz

Onyszkiewicz were appointed in April 1990. 39 In December
1991,

a

civilian,

Jan Parys,

succeeded Vice Admiral Piotr

Kolodzie jczy, who had been in office since July 1990, as

Minister of Defense. 40
In addition,

the Polish parliament introduced a bill

which banned professional soldiers from membership in all

political organizations and required conscripts to suspend
their membership in political organizations during their
time of service. 41 In an effort to reduce the communist

influence in the armed forces every political organ of the
former Communist party and all party organizations within
the army had been resolved. In addition,
38

Jerzy Markowski,

39

Harold S.Orenstein,

40

in:

Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430

41

in:

Harold Orenstein,

1990,

p.273.

1990,

p.71

1990,

p.65
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a

fundamental

recasting of positions throughout the
apparatus took
place. 4? Also, the withdrawal of armed
forces from the
former Soviet Union should be completed
by November 1992. 43

Furthermore, the Polish military set forth

new

a

ideological orientation. The constitution Act,
article eight
notes, that "The Polish Armed Forces stand
guard over
the

sovereignty,

security and peace of the Polish nation". 44

According to Poland's former vice minister of national
defense Bronislaw Komorowski, the "army must be
for securing Polish democracy". 45

Here,

.

.

.

an element

the army is trying

to reintroduce historic values which focus on honor,

tradition and the service to the nation, including

a

depoliticization from Marxist traditions 46 which should
replace the former communist values and the ideological

orientation towards
Thus,

a

a

confrontation with the West.

complex restructuring process was imposed on

the military. The military-educational system was reformed

with the founding of the new National Defense Academy. The
new institution is directly subordinated to the minister of
defense, whereas the faculty members are military men. The
42

in:

43

Europa,

44

in:

Jerzy Markowski,

45

in:

Peter Podbielski,

46

see: Peter Podbielski,

Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430
1992,

Vol.II, p.2250
1990,

p.269
p.72

1990,
1990,

28

p.72

Academy emphasizes not only

military aspects, but social

sciences are also integrated in the
academic schedule, with
the aim of educating a future officer,
who "consciously and
actively participates in the nation's
sociological

processes"." Religion, which was oppressed in
the days of
the "people's army" again is allowed to
play
an important

role. With the establishment of the
position of a military

bishop ordinary/* the military respects the deep
rooted
religious consciousness prevalent in society.
But the current situation is not as optimistic
as it

might appear. The Polish military has problems in
gaining

acceptance and respect among large parts of the population.

Although the military can look back on

a long and

glorious

tradition of service to the nation, the suppressions of
worker unrest in 1956 and 1970 and in particular during the
imposition of martial law under General Wojciech Jaruzelski

attributed to
military

.

a

skeptical and pessimistic view of the

The attitude of the public could result in an

isolation of the military from society.
The prestige of the profession of a soldier has

decreased, elucidated by severe problems of the military in

attracting new recruits and officers. This tendency seems
remarkable against the background of high unemployment

throughout the country. The problem surmounted to such
47

in:

Peter Podbielski,

48

in:

Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A434-438

1990,

p.75

29

levels that the military worries
about the fulfillment of
its functions in future years.
Material reasons, such as
lack of housing and a scarcity of
jobs for family members in
several -often remote- garrison towns
are regarded as the
main causes.
139

The economic prospect for the military
appears rather
critical. The defense budget of 1990 was
20 percent lower

than that of 1987
on wages,

(in real terms)

.

Sixty percent was spent

maintenance, uniforms, and medical services. 50

In sum,

Poland undertook

a

heavy reduction of its

forces in order to reduce the internal threat of
political

pressure by the military. Several constitutional
arrangements account for the establishment of civilian
supremacy. Civilian influence within the armed forces and in

particular communist organs has been eased. The armed forces
are trying to find a new identity and ideological base,

grounded in democracy, religion, the defense of the country
and national heritage. This process is clouded by the lack
of acceptance of the military among the population and the

declining prestige of the military profession, which could
lead to an alienated army, whereas the military is not

incorporated into the democratic society. In addition, an
overall stringent economy and a further deterioration of the
49

in:

50

Jerzy Markowski,

Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A432-434
1990,

p.271
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state finances can endanger the
material standard of the
soldier. Thus, the military in Poland
represents a threat to
the establishment of democracy.

2

.

Hungary
Hungary made

a

rapid transformation from

a

one-party

rule of the Communist party to a multi-party
democratic
system. But the political revolution of the late 1980

's

which ignited the democratization processes in
Eastern
Europe hindered
constitution.

51

a

careful elaboration of the country's

Thus,

a

clear distinction of functions and

authorities between the political units is missing. This

"constitution-crisis" has also implications on the formal
aspects of civilian supremacy over the military. In a

decision on the authorities of the President, the Supreme
Court referred largely to military competence and tried to

adjudicate over differing interpretations of the

constitution
Thus,

52

the Hungarian armed forces are led by their

commander in chief, currently General Lieutenant Kalman
Lorincz

.

But the commander is dependent on the directives of

civilian authorities. In peacetime, the ministry of defense

represents the authority. In times of
51

see:

52

see: Osteuropa,

a crisis,

Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A282

May 1992, p.A285-A288
31

the decision

to go on/off alert and the engagement
of the armed forces in
both domestic and foreign conflicts
belongs to the

government which needs

a

two-thirds approval from

parliament
Therefore, Hungary follows a traditional
pattern of
civil supremacy, prevalent in other European
states. The
military is given an autonomous realm in
operating the armed
forces, whereas in political decisions which
transcend the
realm of strictly military matters, civilian
levels

represent the final authority.
In trying to reduce the former communist
influence over

the apparatus, Hungary stressed

a

policy that seeks officers

who cannot be strongly identified with the country's

communist past for the highest military posts. In decreasing
the internal threat which the apparatus can impose on the

democratic system, the country undertook measures of
reductions in size,

53

set forth by the new defense policy

which is based on the assumption that smaller forces have to
be capable of providing for the national security. 54 In

addition,

officers over 55 were being pensioned and 15 from

53

Total strength of the
1991: 86,500 (45,900
1988: 99,000 (64,000
Source: Europa, 1992,

54

Osteuropa, May 1992, p.287

Hungarian armed forces:
conscripts)
conscripts)
Vol.I, p.1329; 1989, Vol.I, p.1262

32

the country's 39 generals in
leading posts were retired

An increasing westernization of
the Hungarian military
ideology can be recognized. A striking
symbol is the
replacement of two MIG aircraft by F-16
airplanes, provided
by the United States." In addition,
a formal diplomatic
6

relationship with NATO was established through
the Hungarian
embassy in Brussels. This policy represents
a radical step.
Shortly after the overthrow of the communist
regime, the

former member of the Warsaw Pact uttered its
desire to leave
the organization by the end of 1991. In
1990, Hungarian
forces already stopped taking part in WTO exercises
and in
June 1991 the last Soviet soldier left the country.
Instead,

Hungary sought military cooperation with the West in the
fields of drug traffic and terrorism. The culmination of
this new orientation was the suggestion by the Defense

Committee of the Hungarian parliament in September 1990, to
send

a

battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the forces of the

United Nations in the wake of the Gulf war.
Hungary seeks for

a

modernization as well as

a

reduction of its armed forces in order to create an

effective army for the defense of the country. This change
of perspective -from an aggressive WTO-doctrine to a

defensive character- is indicated by
55

Stephen Bowers,

56

in:

1991,

Stephen Bowers,

p.287

1991,

p.288
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a

statement of Defense

Minister Lajos Fur who sees the base
of the Hungarian
security in diplomacy and politics,
whereas the military is
for the sole purpose of defending the
national
sovereignty

57

The attitude of the Hungarian population
towards the

military is one of skepticism. The armed forces
are further
confronted with a "historical lack of legitimacy"...
and

with a "powerful antimilitary sentiment in
society". 58 The
respect towards the soldier decreased constantly
throughout
the communist period. Although some units fought
against

Soviet troops in the uprising of 1956, the military
as a

whole stayed out

.

And although the apparatus held

a

skeptical attitude towards the intervention in

Czechoslovakia in 1968, it still never challenged the
political authority. Its political significance was minor,
indicated in the fact that Hungary never had

a

minster of

defense on the Politburo. 59 Instead it followed the party

directives and showed little interest in the political

process

60
.

To integrate the military into an integral part of

society it is vital for the armed forces to regain
57

58

in:

a

Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281

Keith Crane, Steven Popper and Barbara Kliszewski, 1990, p.3

59

Keith Crane,

60

for an historical background of the Hungarian military see:
Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.145-158

Steven Popper,

Barbara Kliszewski,

34

1990,

p.5

respected social status. The conditions
are present, despite
the experiences during the dark ages
of Communism.
Like its

counterpart

m

tradition with

Poland, the Hungarian military has a
long
a

certain pride in serving the country, it

remains necessary for the civil sectors of
society to
further foster the process of an integration
of the

apparatus. The military found a new ideological
base in the
defense of the country and an orientation towards
a

cooperation with the West. But for

a full

integration, the

Hungarian society needs to be aware that an alienated army
imposes a severe internal threat to democracy. Therefore

a

cognitive turnaround is necessary. Hungary needs to develop
an attitude that the military is a vital element of a

democracy with its important function as

a

guarantor for

national security.
In sum,

Hungary took important measures in establishing

civilian supremacy. The country reduced communist influence
over the military and further diminished a possible internal

threat imposed by the military on democracy by a reduction
in size. Cooperation with NATO and western countries and the

sole purpose of the army to defend the country has the

capacity to serve as

a

new ideological base, whereas the

forced retirement of former army generals indicates

a

further break with the past. Despite these positive
developments, the danger of an alienated army is still

35

present due to

a

skeptical attitude of large parts of
the

population

3.

Czechoslovakia

Since the "Velvet Revolution" in December
1989 the
country implemented a variety of reforms to
incorporate the
military into the democratic system and to guarantee

civilian rule. The Defense Act of 14 March 1990 notes
that
soldiers in active service, except soldiers summoned
to

military exercises, have their membership and activities in
political parties and movements suspended". 61 A "Czech Army
Council on Cooperation with the Public" was introduced with
the task to pay attention to the individual's right on

security interests and the influence of interstate ethnic

relations on national security issues.

A civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky, replaced General Miroslav

Vacek as defense minister in October 1990 to reassert
civilian control. In addition, the position of

a

general

inspectorate for the army was created. The inspectorate,
independent from the ministry of defense and chosen by
parliament,

cooperates with civilian representatives and

consults with the ministry of internal affairs and the

ministry of defense. The task of the new agency is to

61

The following set of reforms is drawn from:
Timothy Thomas, 1991, p.47-52
36

control reorganization, modernization
and professionalism of
the military.

Also former President Havel intended
to make the
defense budget information public, by reporting
it to the
Parliamentary Military and Security Committee".
In

addition, the military office of the President
is in charge
of ensuring communication between the
President and the

ministry of defense. Finally, the military office
of the
President is responsible for letters from the public,
concerning military affairs.

Czechoslovakia is undergoing heavy reductions in size
and a process of restructuring. Through 1992, the country
will reduce the forces to 130,000 men, down from an overall

strength of 208,000 soldiers in

1

988.

62

Until 1996

a

professionalization of 50 per cent is planned. 63 The
defense budget was cut by 40 per cent
inflation)

(adjustment of

in 1990 from 35.6 billion to 31 billion koruny.

Expectations accounted for 26.5 koruny by the end of 1991.
To ease the tensions between the civil and military

sectors of society, conscript service was reduced from 24 to
18

months and will be even further cut to 12 months in late

1993. Further innovations are a civilian service option

month)

,

new food allowances,

(27

longer leave time and the

introduction of religious services. The overall goal is to
62

in:

63

Timothy Thomas,

Europa, Vol.I,

1989,

1991,

p.836

p.52
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make the military service more humane,
thus preventing
negative attitude of the people and
especially

a

of the

conscripts towards the military -a step
towards an
integration into the new society. To foster
the achievement
of this goal, the ministry of defense
"Educational and
Cultural Administration" was founded in 1990
to further
reduce the gap between military and society.
The institution
is responsible for formulating and implementing
state

educational and cultural policies in the army.
In providing a new ideological base for
the military,

the CSFR formulated its own doctrine, based on the
premise
of a "reasonable defensive sufficiency".

64

As opposed to

the former doctrine, dominated by the military staff,

influenced and even corrected by the Soviet military, the
new ideology is defensive and non-aggressive. But the

provision of

a

secure cognitive base within the realm of

a

democratic society is as yet incomplete. The military's

performances in recent history made the people skeptical
towards the military. This attitude is indicated by the
numerous civilian checks on the apparatus.

During the era of the Warsaw Pact, the Czech military
was overpowered by the Soviet dominance. Also,

in

confrontational situations such as Hitler's invasion in
1939,

64

the Prague Spring in 1968 as well as during the

Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
in: Timothy L. Thomas, 1991, p.53
38

"Velvet Revolution", the military
acted with restraint. In
addition, according to Jiri Valenta, 65
the country can be
described as "simply antimilitary... where
the use of force
runs contrary to the state's cultural
values".
The recent reluctance of the military
in defending the
country, supporting democracy and its
past association with
an unpopular communist regime make the
process of

integration difficult. The task is to develop an
ideological
base,

consisting of the pride to protect the country's

sovereignty as well as

changing of the public's attitude,

a

which currently regards the military as "subservient,

expensive and useless. 66 It will further reduce the gap

between civilians and the military and will provide for

a

cognitive integration -in this case the recognition of the

necessity of the armed forces- into the democratic society.

The recent discussion over the future of the country,

whether it be as

a

loose union or as two independent and

separate states 67 further increases the uncertainty of the
status of the military. It remains essential to exclude the

military from this controversy. An involvement in this
dispute could result in

civil war, with units taking

a

a

position on either the Slovak or the Czech side. The federal
65

Jiri Valenta,

66

in:

61

see: New York Times,

1982,

Jiri Valenta,

p.130

1982,

p.130

June 21,
39

1992,

p.3

government showed sensitivity and
political wisdom in
rejecting the use of force against
possible separatist
movements in Slovakia and to prevent an
involvement of the
army in solving ethnic conflicts. 68 It
seems as if Czechs
and Slovaks will handle this precarious
situation without
any use of violence, further stressed
by the fact that

historically military conflict between these two
ethnic
groups is nonexistent. But the rising tensions
might serve
as a breeding ground for military intervention
if the

situation remains unstable and unclear.

In sum,

Czechoslovakia made important steps towards an

integration of the military into the democratic society. The

constitution as well as the political praxis provide for
control over the apparatus. A variety of measures

were implemented to ease the tensions between the civil and
the military sectors of society. The internal threat of

political pressure or even

a

coup was limited with

a

reduction in size.
The cognitive integration is as yet incomplete.

Skepticism of the population towards the armed forces
prevails, while an incorporation into the society is further

hindered by an uncertainty over the country's future which

68

Havel on "Radio Free Europe", 25 March 1991,
Timothy L. Thomas, 1991, p.51
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in:

could generate emotions of dissatisfaction
on parts of the
military with the democratic development.

The Military in Spain

C.

JU. The

Position

in

the Authoritarian Regime

In the Franco system the military
was the main

stabilizing force of the regime. The apparatus
formed

a

closed institution within the state, entirely
isolated from
the processes of liberalization and democratization

occurring in the late years of the dictatorship. As Benny
Pollack describes it,
the armed forces had been almost completely cut off
from progressive, modernizing sectors of Spanish
society and remained the staunchest defenders of the
traditional order,
ideologically saturated by the
anti-liberal, anti-democratic value-system of the old
regime" 69
.

.

.

.

During the dictatorship, the apparatus was the center
of political life,

stability.

70

the source for the country's unity and

In the beginning of the democratization process,

the military was unable to adapt to the new system. It

maintained an isolated status and found it difficult to
confront the rising problems, such as crime, terrorism,

69

Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.156

70

Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,

p.18
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autonomy claims by various regions, or
societal changes such
as the new laws on abortion or divorce.
This anti-democratic
attitude can be further explained by the
loss of the

powerful role that the military previously
occupied in the
Franco-regime. One-third of all Franco's ministers
were Army
officers. In contrast, only one officer held
a position in
the Government of 1978. 71

2.

The Transition and Reforms

The new Spanish democracy initially failed to

incorporate the military. The military's skepticism towards
the new system and the government's struggle to control

crime and terrorism culminated in the coup attempt on

February 23,

1981.

The putsch failed due to disagreeing

sections in the Army and the firm action of King Juan Carlos
and his support for the constitution and the parliamentary
system. However, not only in 1981 but also in 1978 and in
1982 was the Army involved in attempted coups.

After 1982 things changed. With the socialist
government of the PSOE in power, backed up by

a

clear

majority in parliament and not as fragile as the former

71

Although the military's influences on politics decreased
significantly, the apparatus still held the important
position of First Deputy Prime Minister, who was
responsible for Defense and Military matters. This position
was taken by Lt. General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado;
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, London, 1979, p.1110
42

Christian Democratic (UCD) governments,
the civil sector of
society gained control over the military.
In 1981,

one year before the PSOE came to
power, the

Army was still heavily overstaffed. Its
size even increased
compared to the last year of the Franco regime. 72
At the

center of the problem was the officer corps.
Although in
1978 the UCD government abolished the guarantee
that every
officer would end his career with at least the rank
of

brigadier general, he still had the right to reach
colonel.
Thus,

promotion was based on age rather than ability.

Furthermore,

Spanish officers tended to be ten years older

on average than other NATO officers. 73 Thus,

the impact of

younger military officers who were brought up during the

opening to western ideas and democracy was still kept to
low level. This was especially important,

a

for elder officers

served under the Franco regime and tended towards former

traditions and privileges.

The Socialist government undertook an ambitious and

costly program of reorganization and modernization of the
military. Its intention was twofold: first, to neutralize
the apparatus as an internal threat and second, to bring the
72

Total strength of the Spanish armed forces:
1975: 302,000, compulsory service of 18 months.
1981: 342,000
compulsory service of 15 months.
in: Europa, Vol.I, 1976, p.1069 and Vol.I, 1982, p.1076

73

The Economist: 20 February 1988, p.48
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military up to NATO-standards

which Spain joined in the

,

summer of 1982. in addition, since the
military budget was
not affected by the heavy austerity
measures imposed by
Prime Minister Gonzales, spending on armaments
soared,

a

reflection of the government's policy to increase

technological standards. This happened also to
please the
military. As a natural reaction, an organization
will be

more supportive of

represents

a

country and its government when it

chief beneficiary of modernization programs.

a

Technological modernization in this case fostered the

integration of the apparatus into democracy. The defense
budget of $6.6 billion or 2.3

%

of GDP in 1987 however was

still below the modest average of the European members of

NATO (3.4%)

7,1
.

The ambition of the government was a

reduction in size by 30 per cent until the year 2000, by

reducing the period of service for conscripts and by

pensioning off 25 per cent of the senior officers

75

to

reduce the number of elder officers who previously served

under Franco. As of June 1990, the total strength of the

armed forces amounted to 274, 500,

76

a

reduction of 22 per

cent since 1978.

74

Economist: 20 February 1988, p.49

75

Edward Moxon-Browne,

76

in:

1989,

p.19

Europa Yearbook, Vol.II, 1991, p.2408.
The military service was still compulsory, lasting 12
months (to be reduced to 9 months during 1992) Conscripts

totaled 200, 900

.
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The constitution,

December

6,

approved by a popular referendum on
1978 inscribed the dominance of the
civilian

sector. The King holds the position of
the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the
Supreme Council of
Defense. The Declaration of war and peace is
announced by
the king under the prior authorization of
the Cortez, the
Spanish parliament. A further step towards
civilian

supremacy was accomplished in 1982, when the
Socialist
government refused to give positions in the Cabinet
to

military officers. 77
Furthermore, the integration in the North Atlantic

Alliance (see also III.B.2)

further bolstered the fragile

democracy by giving the armed forces an external orientation
and a role to play outside the country, thus keeping them
out of internal politics. Multilateral cooperation and

consultation are essential for NATO to maintain its security
function. To achieve this goal, not exclusively civilian

politicians but also military officers are integrated in the

decision-making process. Issues concerning the modernization
of technical equipment,

strategic questions, or maneuvers

require the involvement of the individual member states. The
step towards NATO therefore represented the creation of a

new ideological base for the Spanish military. The apparatus
was now able to identify a common enemy and ceased to think

entirely in internal terms,
11

role which they formerly

a

see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,
45

1983,

p.1083-1085

Played under the Franco regime. This
transformation in
ideology was vital for the securance
of democracy,

it was a
shift from the center of the political
life to contributing
to the defense of the Alliance's
southern

flank.

In short,

Spain was confronted with various

difficulties in integrating the military into

a

democratic

society. After Franco's demise, the apparatus
maintained its
position as a closed institution within the state
with anti-

democratic and anti-liberal attitudes. In the initial
period
of the transformation, the military was still
dominated
by

older Franco-officers who obstructed an adaptation
to the

progressive and modernizing developments in the Spanish
society. This opposition to democracy represented an

internal threat to the new political system,

various coups in the early 1980

's.

illustrated by

Spain responded with

reduction in size of the military and

a

a

pensioning off of

senior officers. Constitutional regulations accounted for a
civil supremacy. In providing a new ideological base and

a

distraction of the military from internal political matters,
Spain achieved an incorporation into NATO,

followed by

a

technical modernization.
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subsequently

P.
1^. The

The Mili tary in Portugal

Position in the Authoritarian

There were striking differences in the
role of the army
in the two Iberian nations during the
transition period. In
Spain, the military stood on the sidelines,
while the

gradual implementation of

a

democratic system was the result

of negotiations between democratic opponents
of Franco and

his successors

18
.

In Portugal,

the army initiated the

breakdown of the old system. The Spanish army represented

a

threat to democracy, while the Portuguese military directed
the process of democratization.

In Spain,

the army was a

rightist force while in Portugal it was leftist.

After the death of Antonio Salazar in 1970, his
successor Marcello Caetano was incapable of leading Portugal
out of an economic and political crisis. The coup of April
25,

1974 was triggered by two precipitant s

.

An economic

recession drove up prices, created social unrest 79 and made
people responsive to changes. The costs for Portugal of
fighting wars in Mozambique and Angola outweighed the

economic advantages of retaining the colonies. A country
with less than nine million people was sustaining an army of
200,000 men, while from 1969 to 1974, almost 40 per cent of

Portugal's GNP was spent for military expenditures. 80 In
78

Kenneth Maxwell,

1982,

p.241

79

Kenneth Maxwell,

1982,

p.235

80

World Military and Arms Transfers, 1980, p.64
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addition fractions of the armed forces
were strongly opposed
to the dictatorship. Caetano was
incapable in offering a
solution to break the deadlock situation in
Africa.

The impact of ten years of colonial
warfare in Africa
was severe on the soldiers. Officer
training for all

candidates included exposure to the revolutionary
ideology
81
of potential adversaries.
The military service abroad

broadened the horizon of military men, who became
aware of
the social, economic and political malaise at home.

These events generated the formation of

organization, the Armed Forces Movement

(AFM)

a

dissident

,

a

group of

basically middle-ranked junior officers who executed an
almost bloodless coup. The significance of the April coup is
that no political party or ideological movement was

involved 82

.

The revolution was entirely initiated by a

faction of the military. The response of the public was

extremely positive. The AFM found

a

wide base of support

among the people, who welcomed the change from years of

dictatorial rule. As Kenneth Maxwell noted,

"in Lisbon and

Oporto, thousands of people poured into the streets and

welcomed the army as liberators". 83

81

James John Tritten,

1979,

p.58

82

James John Tritten,

1979,

p.60

83

Kenneth Maxwell,

1982,

p.231
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2l

—The

-z

Transition and Reforms

After the coup, the military was able
to keep
influence on politics. Until the end of
1975,

a strong

the political

vacuum left behind by the Caetano regime was
filled with six
provisional governments. These changing types
of governments
ranging from West-European pluralism to
East-European

socialism were not the result of
movement,

broad revolutionary

a

led by the AFM or any political party, but
the

maneuvering of different elite factions within the army
which tried to gain control over an unstable political
situation while being uncertain over the type of regime to
be chosen.'*

1

The military represented the core of any

political action. By that time, no political party and no

broadly based revolutionary movement had the capability of

directing the democratization process.
With the sixth provisional government, military

discipline was finally restored 85 and

a

faction,

led by

General Antonio Ramalho Eanes gained power. Eanes saw

Portugal's future in the realm of

a

civilian dominated,

western-type democracy. With the election of
assembly and

a

a

constituent

new constitution which was enacted on 25

April 1976, the power gradually shifted to civilian rule.
But the military was still strong enough to determine the

shape of the constitution. Although the document was the
84

see: Walter Opello,

85

Walter Opello,

1985,

1985,

p.65-82

p.74
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work of civilian political parties,

left-wing officers had

such an impact that Portugal's new
constitution represented
the "most radical in the western world". 86
Article
2

clear indication,

is a

for it pledged the country to ensuring

the transition to socialism by creating
the conditions for the democratic exercise
of power by the working classes". 87

In addition,

article 273 gives the armed forces "the

historic role of guaranteeing conditions which allow
the
peaceful and pluralist transition of Portuguese society
towards democracy and socialism". 88 Furthermore, the

document declared that education should promote
society

a

"classless

and that political parties should participate in

the revolutionary process. 89
The Constitution incorporated a pact between the

military and the major political parties which further

documented the influence of the military to civilian rule.
Under the pact, signed on February 26,

1976,

the influence

of the army in the political process was concentrated in

a

"Revolutionary Council". The 18-man council, headed by the
President
officer)

(who could be either civilian or a military

and composed of members of the armed forces, left

86

Tom Gallagher,

87

in:

Tom Gallagher,

88

in:

Economist, May 28,

89

see:

1985,

p.203

1985,

Lester A.Sobel,

p.203

1977,

1976,

Survey p.7.

p.138
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decisive political powers to the military.
The Council
functioned as a advisory organ to the
President and judged
the constitutionality of legislation
enacted by the National
Assembly. Thus, it opposed attempts to
privatize the
economy.

90

in matters concerning defense as well
as

nationalizations the council had the power to veto
over all
91
legislation.
These supreme powers were finally
relinquished in 1982, when the Council was abolished
by a
two-thirds majority in parliament and replaced by a
mainly
civilian Council of State.

The new Portuguese democracy was confronted with a

military apparatus that had
politics, backed up by

a

significant impact on

a

certain popularity among the

people, while factions of the army obtained

a

revolutionary

attitude. Therefore, the influence of the apparatus had to
be decreased in order to create a stable democratic system

based on civilian rule.
Portugal responded with

severe reduction in size. The

a

army was scaled down from 200,000 in 1974 to under 40,000 in
1

980.

92

Conscription existed, but with many exemptions,

while the time of duty was cut down as well. The draft is

see:

Kenneth Maxwell,

91

Tom Gallagher,

92

Kenneth Maxwell,

1985,

p.243

1982,

p.203

1982,

p.243
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now primarily used as an instrument of
education, by
applying it largely in areas where schooling

is poor.

93

Furthermore, the various Portuguese governments

succeeded in pushing radical officers of the AFM
out of the
political and military realm of significance. The

politicized units which were involved in the various
quarrels for power in the two years following the coup
have
been disbanded. 94 Most of the AFM officers have been
investigated, arrested, transferred to the reserves, or

forced to resign. Others have been moved from command posts
to the administration level.

95

The revolutionary element of

the apparatus was further extinguished through

a

return to a

traditional, more disciplined structure. In this context,
the AFM general assembly - the soldiers' parliament - was

replaced by

a

hierarchical command.

Portugal heavily cut its defense budget. In 1974

military expenditures amounted to 919 million dollars (6.8
per cent of the GNP

dollars

)

while the figures were 649 million

(3.5% of the GNP)

in 1978.

96

Another key element for the integration of the military
into

a

democratic society represented the provision of

a

ideological base for the military. Over ten years the
93

see: Economist,

94

Economist May 28,

95

Stephen Talbot,

96

World Military and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, 1980, p.64

May 28,
1977,

1980,

1977,

Survey p.9

Survey p.9

p.272
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new

Portuguese army was involved in colonial
wars in Africa. As
Douglas Porch noted, throughout the
years of the Salazar
regime, "indignation among many officers
over the

authoritarian nature of the state" 97 increased.
The
military fulfilled its function of serving

the state, but

the army "tolerated rather than supported
the

government".

98

Thus,

the state of mind of the military

complex was ambivalent. The notion of the nation's
glory and
imperial tradition was in contrast to the political

involvement in shaping the new regime, whereas

a

radical

part of the apparatus addressed political issues and
played
a

vanguard role in the Revolution.
Here,

Portugal succeeded in promoting a new role for

the army in the defense of its continental territory and the

securance of the democratic system. As General Eanes said,
"the Army exists only to defend national interests,

and to

guarantee the institutions established by the freely

expressed will of the people through their votes". 99
The revised constitution of 1982,
on

April

2,

initially promulgated

1976 further stresses the new function of the

military within society: "the Portuguese Armed Forces shall

97

Douglas Porch,

1977,

p.22

98

Douglas Porch,

1977,

p.23

99

Economist, May 28,

1977,

Survey p.7
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safeguard national independence, unity of
the State and the
integrity of the national territory". 100
It was vital for Portugal,

to direct the concern of the

military apparatus on external matters. With
the
independence of the former African colonies, Portugal
was in
desperate need for redefining the role for its military.
Despite the securance of the State and therefore of

democratic institutions, the Army should be kept out of
internal politics. This goal was achieved through a
further

integration into NATO, which kept the armed forces occupied,
and by reducing the temptation of political intervention.
In
the aftermath of the revolution, the Alliance feared that

Portugal might fell under communist influence and therefore

excluded the country from its sensitive nuclear planning
group.

101

Today,

Portugal has rejoined this committee. 102

Furthermore, the Constitution manifests the superior
role of the civilian sector over the military. Changes in
the Constitution require a two-thirds majority. The budget,

including the military budget needs to be approved by

a

majority of the assembly which also approves treaties. In
1982,

military personal disappeared from posts in the

government which was now entirely composed of civilian

100

in:

101

see: U.S. News and World Report,

102

for a further discussion on the relationship towards NATO
see chapter IV.B.l

Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,

54

1983,

p.1027
June 30,

1980,

p.23

politicians

103

The council of the Revolution was

completely abolished by transferring its
functions to
several organs. 104 In 1986, the Presidency
has been finally
turned over to a civilian, former Prime Minister
Mario
Soarez. This represents a remarkable step towards
the

establishment of civilian supremacy, for the Presidency,

equipped with significant powers 105 has traditionally
been
the preserve of the armed forces. 106

In sum,

the Portuguese democracy decreased a possible

internal threat of the armed forces. The Military initiated
and directed the transition towards democracy. Over almost
two years following the coup, Portugal was the plaything of
some politically inexperienced officers. Only the seizure of

factions within the military devoted to democracy provided
for a gradual takeover by civilian leaders, who responded

with

a

reduction in size and budget, the promotion of

a

new

ideological base, and the exemption of radical officers from
103

see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,

104

the following organs took over the powers of the Council of
the Revolution:
Council of the State (new) the President, the Government
the Constitutional Tribunal (new consisting of 13 judges)
the Assembly, the Council of National Defense,
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1013

1983,

pp.1027

,

105

The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister,
sets dates for elections, has the right to dissolve
Parliament and presides over the Council of State,
in: Europa, Vol.II, 1991, p.2204

106

see: Douglas Porch,

1977,

p.24
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significant posts. With the revision of
the constitution,
the Revolutionary Council" dissolved
in 1982,

and

a

civilian President, civilian authority
was further
established
But still, the military represents

democracy. As Tom Gallagher noted,

a

threat to

"traditionally, many

officers have viewed the army as an agency which
has

a

duty

to intervene in political life if the parties
abuse the

mandate they have received from the electorate". 107

Although

a

fragmentation of the party system,

economic performance over

a

a

difficult

longer period that would augment

social unrest and which would give the military the

opportunity to intervene seems to be

a

worst-case-scenario,

military tensions should be treated with sensitive
recognition

Tom Gallagher,

1985,

p.214
56

CHAPTER III
THE NECESSITY OF A NEW SECURITY
CONCEPT

To foster and stabilize the process of
democratization
it is necessary to establish a stable
security agenda. For

states as well as for individuals, enjoying
security entails
an effort to limit or even diminish threats.
Threats
to the

democratic society can occur on two different levels

-

internal and external. It is the supreme task for the new

democracies to establish capacities to counterbalance them.
On the internal level, economic performance represents
a

paramount aspect. An unsatisfying material standard can
generate into social unrest. Also, it is vital for the

democracies to incorporate various social groups into the
state or at least into their allegiance. As seen in chapter
II,

the military can impose a severe threat on the system.

In addition,

without the integration of minorities

a

security agenda is incomplete, and therefore gives way to

political violence, ethnonationalism and probable separatist
movements. Furthermore, Eastern Europe has to establish

security concept that manages external threats which run
from border conflicts to the extreme of war.

57

a

A.
1.

Eastern Europe

Internal Threats
The current situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia
and

Hungary imposes

a

variety of internal threats to the newly

established democracies. First, ethnonat ionalism

:

the

general problem with ethnic minorities is their perspective
of oppression with the denial of civil rights or
economic

opportunities in comparison to standards offered by the
country of their ethnic origin. Such claims could result in
demands for better political representation and economic

equality but can also activate notions of nationalism in the
home countries
The result of the parliamentary election in

Czechoslovakia in June 1992 transferred the "Movement for
Democratic Slovakia", headed by Vladimir Meciar into the
strongest political power in Slovakia. Meciar favors

a

loose

confederation of two sovereign nations. 108 In the Federal
Republic, Czechs represent two-thirds of the national

population. The ethnic division of the country is further

augmented in economic terms, for Slovaks live in the

economically lesser developed part of the country. 109
Negotiations between the two sides accounted for the
prospect of

a

limited federal government with the five

108

New York Times, June 21,

109

Daniel N. Nelson,

1991,

1992,

p.139
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p.3

ministries of defense, finance,
foreign affairs.

interior,

economics and

110

As in the case of Yugoslavia, Communism
covered up

ethnic and cultural differences. In Czechoslovakia
however,
both sides seem to agree to the process of the
federation's
split without the use of any violence. The union
was

artificial, backed up by a tight authoritarian regime.
An

eventual separation might even reduce ethnic tensions,
given
the historical fact that Slovaks and Czechs were never

involved in any mutual armed conflicts.
In Hungary,

gypsies and Rumanians represent minority

groups, while Magyars are more than 90 per cent of the

population.

11
'

In Poland,

a

German minority, centered in

Silesia and part of Germany before World War

II,

has kept

strong cultural traditions throughout the communist period.

With the unification, the
join Germany.

112

minority stressed their desire to

These cultural and ethnic tensions in

Poland 113 were suppressed by communist rule. They are now
reaching the surface of the political process in the new

democratic and pluralist society.

110

New York Times, June 21,

111

David Nelson,

1991,

p.140

112

David Nelson,

1991,

p.140

113

for a discussion on the border tensions between Germany and
Poland see Chapter III. A.

1992,

59

p.3

Second,

there is

a

rejection of Capitalism and

a

feeling of disappointment among those societal
groups which
find it hard to adapt to the new political and economic
system.

Communism provided

a

tight and safe social net

for its citizens. The individual's life was organized,

planned,

and taken care of. The social welfare system

provided

a

stable though not prosperous living standard for

nearly all of the population. With the introduction of
Capitalism, privatization, and the gradual decrease of the

state's economic activity people had to organize their life
for themselves. Competition for jobs,

unemployment, drops in

living standards -in general the adjustment to the lifestyle
of liberal Capitalism- created political unrest and tension.

As Vaclav Havel noted:

They (the people) did in fact hate the
totalitarian regime, but at the same time,
they spent their whole life in it, and
in spite of their will, got accustomed to
it. They became used to the fact that there
is an omnipotent state over them that can
do everything, take care of everything and
is responsible for everything. One cannot
just lose this habit overnight". 115

The fear of taking risks, the stress of living without

social certainties was completely new to populations which

had not known unemployment for over forty years. Indications
114

see: New York Times: East Bloc Treads Water in an Ocean of
Lethargy, April 08, 1992, p.Al

115

in:

New York Times, April 08,
60

1992,

p.A12

of this negative attitude towards
Capitalism fostered by a

depressing economic environment can be seen
everywhere
throughout Eastern Europe. The suicide rate in
Poland
increased by ten per cent in 1991, while it
reached a
iiD
record-high in Hungary.
The Presidential election in
Poland in November 1990 turned out to be

a

rejection of the

economic policies of former Prime Minister Tadeusz

Mazowiecki who only finished third in the race.

Third,

there is an apathy towards the democratic

political process mixed with an anger against the current
ruling political elites. The malaise of the economic

situation which has an impact on almost every individual's
life created a "suspicion of governmental authority". 117

Some people blame the political elites, who are viewed as

incapable of solving the social and economic problems. A

mixture

of.

frustration and disillusionment concludes in an

apathy towards the political process.

Indications can already be seen throughout Eastern
Europe.

In the two Presidential elections in Poland in 1990

only sixty per cent and less than fifty per cent of the

electorate voted. In local elections in Hungary and Poland
turnouts were only one-third to two-thirds. 118 In
116

New York Times, April

8,

117

David Nelson,

1991,

p.141

118

David Nelson,

1991,

p.141

1992,

61

p.A12

a

small

town in Poland with 595 voters, only one
person cast his
ballot
Although low proportions are not uncommon
in
.

long-established democratic societies, in

a

young democracy

after decades of authoritarian rule this indicates
already
disinterest for political participation and the
political

a

process in general.
Such apathy and distrust towards the ruling
governments
give space for new political movements and ideas, which
need
not necessarily follow democratic patterns. The candidacy
of

Stanislaw Tyminski can be regarded as an example that showed
the vulnerability of the political public to vote for

candidates who do not present

a

program but

a

mere

antithesis to the political establishment mixed with

populistic notions. The Polish emigrant Tyminski,
claimed,

a

self-

self made-millionaire, who flew in from Canada

without a political organization and with hardly any

campaigning finished second in the Presidential elections
behind Lech Walesa.

Fourth, the old nomenclature: the former communist

party-apparatus infiltrated all sectors of society.
Recently,

some post-communist leaders of Eastern Europe have

been accused of prior cooperation with the Communist secret

119

New York Times, April

8,

1992,
62

p.A12

police.

120

Although Eastern Europe expelled top
officials
of the communist parties from political
positions,

the web

between party and state-bureaucracy was
so close-meshed,
that numerous party members and
secret-police informers who
kept the system working remained in
government jobs.
This

former entanglement of party and state can
delay or even
damage the democratization process. Old attitudes,
values
and modes of behavior linger on and slacken
the

transformation from an authoritarian bureaucracy into
an
institution responsible to the democratic state.

Fifth,

the economic performances of the particular

countries play

a

crucial role

(see also Table 1.).

growth is the financial base for the development of

Economic
a

society. The recent revolutions in Eastern Europe including
East Germany proved that people also supported democracy for
an eventual improvement of their own particular economic

situation. This "promise" made by capitalism has to be

fulfilled by the different countries in order to avoid

120

In Poland,

former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski issued a
list of members of the parliament who cooperated with the
former secret police. The incident caused an uproar
resulting in the ousting of Olzewski's government.
in: New York Times, 21 June, 1992
In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak parliament released a report
linking the republic's most popular politician, Vladimir
Meciar, to the secret police. Meciar denied the charges
and gained a solid majority in Slovakia in the
parliamentary elections of June 1992.
in: New York Times Magazine, 31 May 1992
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Table

1

.

Economic Data on Eastern Europe

Unemployment Czechoslovakia: 6.5 per cent
Hungary
8.3 per cent
Poland:
12.2 per cent
:

Inflation

Czechoslovakia: 2
per cent
Hungary:
35
per cent
Poland:
1266 per cent

(December 1991)
(December 1991)
(March
1992)
(June

1991)
1991)
(February 1990)
(

Extern al debt Czechoslovakia: US$ - 8,100
million
Hungary:
US$ -20,
million
Poland:
US$ -39,282 million
GNP pe r head

Czechoslovakia: US$ 3,450
Hungary:
US$ 2,560
Poland:
US$ 1,700

source: Europa Yearbook,

(1990)
(1990)
(1990)
(1989)
(1989)
(1990)

Vol I
p.887, 1329
Vol .II, p 2250

1992,

.

.

disappointment and frustration which eventually lead to

a

disapproval of the democratic and capitalist system and to

political unrest. The example of Argentina in the 1970

's

showed that a failure in improving the general standard of
living endangers democracy and make people receptive to

anti-democratic change.
With the transformation from

a

state economy to

a

market capitalism four major problems emerged, all similar
in Poland,

Hungary and Czechoslovakia. First, trade shocks:

soon after the upheavals in Eastern Europe in the summer of

64

1989 trade with the Soviet Union began to decrease. 121
The

USSR reduced its deliveries of oil and natural gas
in order
to export them for hard currency to the West As
a
.

consequence, the artificial pricing system within the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) came under
severe pressure,

and eventually led to the dissolution of

COMECON in June 1991. Suddenly, Eastern Europe had to pay
more for energy supplies and raw materials.

Furthermore the growing chaos in the Soviet economy
further disrupted trade relations with Eastern Europe 122

.

The USSR fell behind in its payments to East European

suppliers, while the newly emerged republics declined to

cover the debts. East European firms responded by

withholding further supplies unless
offered,

a

bank guarantee was

thus reducing the amount of trade even further.

With German unification, trade relations of Eastern
Europe with the GDR came to an end. East Germany represented
a

market for agricultural and industrial goods and provided

scarce industrial components and high-technology

products.

123

Also,

western companies gained access to

markets formerly dominated by communist state-economies,
while the products of Eastern European enterprises have not

been able to compete with western products. In addition,
121

Mark Kramer,

1992,

p.136

122

Mark Kramer,

1992,

p.137

123

Mark Kramer,

1992,

p.138
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trade among all Eastern European
countries dropped
significantly after the transformation to
hard currency
accounting within the COMECON system.
Second, privatization of former state
owned enterprises
has been hobbled by legal complications.
Although Hungary,

Poland and Czechoslovakia have implemented
privatization
programs, the legal situation of numerous cases
is still

unsolved. The issue circulates around two problems:
the

controversy of either restitution or compensation
of
formerly expropriated citizens and the pace of the
reforms.
Private property is a basic element of capitalism.
It

is a

paramount necessity for the three nations to clarify the
process of transformation from state into private ownership.
Until then, due to this unstable situation entrepreneurs and

companies will remain hesitant about investing in the
market,

claims.

for they might later have to face restitution
124

Third,

the implementation of

Eastern Europe involves

a

a

market economy in

set of reforms. Price

liberalization, currency convertability
reforms, privatization,

,

trade and banking

labor deregulation and

a

macro

economic stability are the goals set fourth by Poland,

Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The actual timing of all these

124

see:

Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.26-27
Mark Kramer, 1991, p.139-144
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measures represents
Poland,

therapy

a

difficult task. 125 In the case of

the country followed the concept of a "shock
,

a

radical shift towards Capitalism within

short

a

period of time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have taken
gradualist approaches. Neither economists nor past

experiences offer clear advice about how to proceed. The

transformation of

a

centrally planned economy into

a

free

market system represents an unparalleled experience,

previously unknown in history.
Fourth,

economic and political culture: forty years of

Communism had

severe impact on the mentality of the

a

people. The regime organized the individual's life. Jobs,
social security, even leisure was to

a

large extent provided

and controlled by the state apparatus. Life followed

a

beaten and streamlined track, apathy dominated. A capitalist
society however demands personal engagement and creativity.

Everyone is to
or her life.

a

certain extent responsible to organize his

It will take an

unpredictable amount of time to

change the people's mentality. The success of Capitalism

depends on innovative individuals. Innovation however, was

neglected for forty years.
The people in Eastern Europe got used to a certain

personal materialistic security:

a

guaranteed job and

a

tight social net. This level of security is not provided by

see: Michael Roskin,

Janusz Ordover,

1991, p.180-185
1991, p.27-28
67

capitalism. It seems only logical
that people have problems
adjusting to this abrupt cognitive
change. A life-time
guarantee turned into the need for
personal effort.

Therefore all of the three Eastern
European countries
are confronted with heavy worker
resistance. When
implementing measures which were initially
designed to bring
the economy on the path of free
market, interest collisions
were often unavoidable. Austerity
measures, the liberation
of prices or the privatization of
former state-owned
enterprises including massive lay-offs
affected and

threatened the individuals' materialistic
security. Thus,
worker unrest has limited the government's
range of reform
choices and policies. 126
In

Czechoslovakia in early 1991, labor unrest forced
the federal administration to surrender
its plan
to

quadruple the prices of electricity, gasoline and
heating.
Also,

due to worker pressure in Slovak factories

Czechoslovakia continues to produce military equipment,

designed for the export to Third-World countries. Public
pressure in Slovakia remained so strong that the federal
government had to delay its plan and ideological commitment
to gradually refrain from military exports.

Furthermore,

resistance prevented agricultural

decollectivization. In Poland, the Presidential election in
late 1990 showed the dissatisfaction of the population with
see: Mark Kramer,

1992,

p.145-146
68

the austerity measures of Tadeusz Masowiecki

.

provided

It

for a decisive victory for the populist Lech
Walesa,

in

Hungary, the government abandoned its plan to
cut

agricultural subsidies after nationwide protests. Labor
unrest created pressure on the government to loosen
some

austerity measures
Sixth,

represents

the inherited economic system of Communism
a

brake block for the development of

a

capitalist

system. Communism left an economic disaster behind. 127

Prices of goods were unrelated to costs and heavily
subsidized. The inherited foreign debts taken over from the
former regimes are striking (see table III.l). Industrial

production, technology, agriculture and infrastructure had

severe deficits compared to western standards and now has to
be either reorganized or entirely substituted in order to

gain a competitive position in the world market.
In Poland and Czechoslovakia,

a

"Mittelstand"

128

which represents the backbone of every market economy was
simply missing. A slight relief exists in Hungary, for the

country introduced modest market reforms in the early 1980

's

that gave permission for private economic activity for some
small businesses to compete with products, manufactured by

state-owned enterprises.

127

see:

128

The German term refers to entrepreneurs with small or midsize businesses.

Janusz Ordover,

1991,

p.25
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A financial infrastructure,
such as stock and bond
markets and private commercial
or investment banks
was
absent in communist economies.
Finally, the management
of
state businesses simply lacked
capitalist financial and
management skills, disregarding
consumers' needs or cost
minimization. Economic activity was
based on plan
assessments. Fixed production quotas
over a
time span of

five years had to be fulfilled,
thus neglecting market or
social influences or changing demands
or market situations.
The capitalist management skill
to respond to reality was
left undone, substituted by bureaucracy.
To overcome this
deficit, the post-communist governments
tried to attract

western expertise to work in Eastern Europe.
But apart from
metropolitan areas such as Prague or Budapest,
foreign
managers were confronted with housing which
does not match
western standards, a lack of cultural entertainment
or a

pre-war telephone network; in short an environment
which
demands a certain amount of idealism.

2.

External Threats

A variety of external threats represent

a

challenge to

the security and endanger the process of the establishment
of a stable democracy. First,

Poland and Germany signed

a

bilateral treaty in 1990, in which Germany recognized the
western border of Poland. In 1991,
70

a

formal commitment to

friendship and cooperation has been reached. 129 But
the
region of Silesia remains a political issue. Among

some

Germans,

the Polish part of Silesia is still seen as

part of the German nation with

heritage. From

a

a

a

legal

German tradition and

legal point of view the issue seemed to be

settled. However, the strong ties of the German part of

Silesia to its Polish counterpart still represent
for possible tensions.

In addition,

a

source

tensions along the

remaining borderline recently escalated into violent attacks
against Polish visitors to eastern Germany. Right-extremists
as well as average eastern German citizens blamed Poles for

buying out their shops, while conflicts were further

sharpened by ethnic tensions. Such incidents indicate that
old issues and resentments are now emerging again. For forty
years Communism imposed

a

forced friendship upon the two

states of East Germany and Poland,
"Peace Border".

Second,

It was a fake,

a

brotherhood along the

far from reality.

the unpredictable situation in the republics of

the former Soviet Union. Although an intentional aggression
is hardly to be feared,

Eastern Europe nevertheless has to

raise concern about the political development in this
region. According to Gerhard Wettig,

belligerent action could lead to
129

New York Times,

03 April,

130

Gerhard Wettig,

1992,

1992

p.233
71

a

"the momentum of

spillover effect". 130 An

armed conflict on former
Soviet territory would
involve
further security risks, such
as the use of ABC
weapons,

’

unsafe or irresponsible stored
dangerous material, or
nuclear weapons and their
difficult protection against
illegal appropriation. Additional
threats are drug
trafficking from Asia, organized
crime and possible largescale migrations due to mass
poverty or war. 131
In this context,

the security of Poland is
particularly

endangered. According to

million ethnic Poles

333

a

Soviet census in 1989

,

1.12

are living in parts of
Belorussia,

Ukraine and Lithuania, which belonged
to Poland in the
period preceding World War II. The
potential of a rising
Polish nationalism could increase
the tension along the
various borderlines.
Furthermore, the new republics Belorussia,
Ukraine and
Lithuania are themselves democracies in
transition. Their
democratization process is unstable as well.
The political
direction which these countries pursue seems
to be

democratic. However, the victory of the
former Communist
Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania indicates
that the

possibility of political unrest, turmoil and regime
change
should not be neglected. Also, Ukraine imposes
an acute

131

132

see:

Gerhard Wettig,

Daniel N. Nelson,

1992,

1991,

p.233-234

p.142
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problem

Even if the country gives up
its nuclear weapons
it still possesses a powerful
army of some 400, 000
133
men.

Third,

Hungary and the Hungarian minorities
in its
bordering countries. With the treaty
of Trianon

in 1920,

Hungary was forced to give up one-third
of its pre-war
territory to Romania, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and
Austria. Today, more than four million
Hungarians live in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. 134
Due to these
large minority groups in Eastern European
nations, voices of
Hungarian nationalism and even unification
based on a common
historical and cultural identity, as well as
border tensions
are likely in this region.
The most severe tension is represented in
the case of

Romania. Figures estimate that between 1.5 and
2.3 million

Hungarians are living in the Rumanian territory of

Transylvania

The Hungarian minority claims that they

.

have been denied economic and political rights.
Furthermore,
the political process towards democracy is making
progress
in Hungary,

while it lags severely behind in Romania, which

is more or less a new communist dictatorship in pseudo-

democratic disguise.

133

Otto Pick,

134

New York Times, April

135

1992,

David Nelson,

p.28

1991,

08,

1992,

p.143
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p.A12

Also,

the 600,000 Hungarians living
in Slovakia are
confronted with the uncertainty of the
future of the CzechSlovak Federal Republic. In an
independent Slovak
state,

consisting of only 4.5 million people,
the chances are
likely that they will press for
greater
autonomy.

Fourth,

the unstable situation in former
Yugoslavia.

With ethnic groups struggling for
independence, the
artificial construct of Yugoslavia imposes a
further threat
to the security of Eastern Europe. Serbian
aggressiveness
already has culminated into a spill over effect
to foreign
territory. Border violations resulted in the
bombardment of
the Hungarian border town Bares in October 1991. 136
The

civil war in former Yugoslavia caused

a

tide of refugees.

The estimated figure in Bosnia alone amounts to
1.3 million,

from which at least 700,000 have fled the country.
Croatia
as well as West European governments have resolved
not to

admit any more.

137

conflict imposes

The uncertainty of the outcome of this
a

security threat to all Eastern European

states. Control mechanisms to manage the civil war are so
far not existent.

As these examples show, the entire region of Eastern

Europe is confronted with numerous security threats, but is
see:
137

Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281

see: New York Times,

October 28,

1992,

p.A8

lacking

reliable security structure. In
fact, in the
aftermath of the Cold War and with the
destruction
a

of the

Warsaw Pact, Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia are facing
security vacuum. "Europe's unstable East" 138

a

needs to

implement

new security concept that is capable
of
counterbalancing a variety of internal and
external threats,
order to prevent antidemocratic forces from
challenging
the new regimes
a

m

B.
1.

The Transition of Spain

Internal and External Threats
Spain was confronted with several internal threats.

First,

the role of the armed forces: as seen in II. C. the

military represented

a

severe threat to the new democracy.

The incorporation into the new system failed,

for the Army

was not offered a new ideological base - the role of

a

defender of democracy instead of the former positions as

a

security force for internal repression.

Second, political violence and terrorism, especially in

the Basque country,

challenged the new regime. This issue is

closely related to regionalism and demands for regional

autonomy in Spain. Comparable to the current situation in
138

David Nelson,

1991,

p.137
75

Eastern Europe, regional and cultural
dive rsif ication was
suppressed over the years of authoritarian
rule. After 1977
these demands abruptly emerged.

Third,

I

the democratic governments of
the UCD and the

PSOE were confronted with unfavorable
economic conditions.
The task of adapting the industrial
complex to competitive
international standards happened during a
worldwide economic
39
downswing
including two major oil crises and resulted
in
high unemployment rates, which are still
the highest among
all OECD countries. In 1978, 8 per cent
were
1

out of job,

while this figure increased to 22 per cent
in 1986.

140

The economic transformation of Spain into
a market

economy initially suffered from various problems,
inherited
by the Franco regime. 141 The technological standard
was

poor with low capital investment. 142 The economic

modernization of the 1960
139

Edward Malefakis,

140

in:

1986,

's

and the unprecedented growth

p.229

Europe Yearbook, Vol.I,
1980, p.1080
Vol.II, 1986, p 2369
.

141

GNP and Education in 1971 compared with other countries.

France
GNP per head (in US$)
% by sector agriculture
industry

3.180

:

6.0

:

48

expenditure on education
(%

.

4.5

Greece

Spain

120

1.070
13.5

1

.

19.5
30.5
2

34

.

2.2

of GNP)

Source: OECD Economic Survey, 1973, p.65
142

Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,

p.5
76

rates were based on the development
of basic industries,
such as shipbuilding and steel
production and did not relate
to the fundamental structural
problems of the Spanish

economy. Spain had traditionally been
an agricultural
country. Modernization however did not
cover this sector.
The problems increased with the rise
in oil prices
after 1973 when suddenly shipbuilding and
steel were

confronted with higher production costs. 143 Due
to Franco's
reliance on a system of autarky, international
trade

relations had been neglected for decades.
after Franco's demise in 1975,

144

Furthermore,

labor costs increased and the

economy largely depended on foreign investment,
capital and
technology. The initial economic problems put the new
regime

under a harsh test. The government was forced to put
large
sums of money aside to finance unemployment. Also,
Madrid
was confronted with severe inflation due to excessive
wage

levels and expenditures of the public sector. Also, the

annual growth of the GDP, which averaged an impressive seven

per cent between 1960 and 1973 dropped significantly (see
also Table

2

.

)

143

Benny Pollack,

144

In 1973 imports totaled 561.543 million pesetas, compared
to 4.177.034 million pesetas in 1983. The corresponding

1987,

p.141

figures for exports are 302.670 and 2.846.749 million
pesetas which represent an increase of 370 per cent
(imports) and 470 per cent (export) over a period of 10
years.
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,
1978, p.1117
Vol.II,
77

1986,

p 2369
.

Table

2.

Economic

Pat. a

on Spain

in per cent:

Inflation
1977
1978
1979
1983
1985

:

:

:

:

:

28, 0
16, 5
15, 0
12, 2

GDP Growth rates
1979
0, 8
1980
1,7
1981
0,4
1982
1,2

Unemployment
1978
1981
1983:
1984
1986:

:

:

:

:

:

:

8, 1

sources
Europa Yearbook, Vol
Vol

.1,
.1,

Vol .1,
Vol .11,

1978,
1981,
1983,
1985,

p. 1108

p.1089
p.1070
p.

802

Vol
Vol

.1,
.1,

Vol.I,
Vol .11,

8, 0

11, 6
17, 0
20, 0
22, 0

1980,
1982,

p 1080

1984,
1986,

p.

.

p.1076
775

p.2369

The socialist government of the PSOE responded to
these

problems in an unexpected way, almost using conservative
measures. The PSOE made little attempt to create new jobs.

According to Edward Moxon-Browne, unemployment is widely
accepted in Spain among all Spanish parties, but it is

acknowledged that nothing can directly be done about

it.—

Instead,

the Gonzales administration devaluated the

Peso in its first year in power by

145 / Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,

146 / Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,

per cent ,—' cut

p.10

1978,
78

8

p.2369

public expenditures and froze wages and
gave priority to
fighting inflation— in order to establish
an economic
climate which would stimulate private investment
and

therefore create jobs. The PSOE intended to promote
more
technologically advanced industries, hoping to
transform the
economic structure of the country from a labor-intensive
system into

a

capital-intensive system .!!§/

Several conditions favored the success of the Spanish

transition. The support for democracy was already strong
some years prior to Franco's demise. This positive
attitude

among the population provided for

a

"reservoir of good

will"— when the government was under economic pressure.
7

Also,

the international and regional environment favored the

combination of

a

democratic regime and

a

capitalist economy,

so that the process of integration into the international

market could succeed.
Furthermore, tourism served as
the economy

.—

7

a

booming sector within

The number of tourists outnumbered the

entire Spanish population as early as in 1972. This had

a

strong impact on Spanish life. Secularism and consumerism
developed, a proper infrastructure was created, and the

147

/

see:

148 / in:

Edward Moxon-Browne
Benny Pollack,

1987,

149 / Edward Moxon-Browne,
150 / Edward Malefakis,

1989,

,

p.143

1989,

1986,

p.14

p.218
79

p.8-10

tourist industry benefitted mainly small
scale enterprises
and helped create a "Mittelstand"
Most significantly,

Spain early sought for an

integration into the European community. On
July
the UCD -government applied for full membership

28,

1977,

of the EC.

The other parties in the Spanish parliament
fully supported
the government's decision. According to Benny
Pollack,

there was total agreement that no economically
viable or politically suitable alternative to
the European Community existed. It was accepted
that. .accession would be considered by the
Spanish people as a display of international
political support for the new democratic regime". 1^-'
.

incorporation into the Community was judged as
fostering factor to uplift the economy and as

a

a

security

force for the success of reforming the political system into
a

democracy.

In terms of external threats Spain did not have to face
a

major problem. Although the country made its transition to

democracy while the antagonism of the Cold War was still
valid,

the Spanish KP gradually lost public support. The

threat of a possible communist infiltration connected with
the strategic importance of the Iberian peninsula in the

backyard of western Europe was at no times compelling.

151 / Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.138

2.

The New Spanish Security Policy
The main feature of the new Spanish
security was the

membership in NATO. After Franco the Alliance
showed
enthusiasm about a Spanish incorporation .Hi But
7

skeptical Spanish public was opposed to join

the

a

military

alliance where the United States was the commanding
force.
Spain showed little enthusiasm for American foreign
policies
in La t in-America

.—

7

The U.S. had sustained the Franco

regime with economic and military aid through an
agreement,

signed in 1953. In return, Franco gave the U.S. four

military bases, over which they had virtually sovereign
control. After Franco's death, these bases represented

a

political issue of great controversy.—'' A strong
neutralist stand existed in Spain that argued against
Spanish involvement in Cold War alliances, while the

American presence actually endangers the Spanish security.
The military bases therefore did not only represent

a

reminder of the former Franco-U.S. cooperation, but further
had the potential of drawing Spain into the pattern of the

East-West conflict.
152 / Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.152

153 / Differences arose over El Salvador and Nicaragua. Prime
Minister Gonzalez as vice president of the Socialist
International and head of the Committee for the Defense
of the Nicaraguan Revolution favored direct
negotiations between the Salvadoran guerrillas and
government, and opposed efforts to destabilize the

Sandinista government.
154

/

see:

Edward Moxon-Browne,
81

1989,

p.86

The first Christian-Democratic
government under Adolfo
Suarez advocated NATO but was still hesitant,
fearing a

break of the general consensus on Spanish
foreign policy.
With the coup in February 1982, the necessity
to integrate
the military into society became evident.
Suarez'

successor,

the Christian-Democrat Calvo Soleto regarded
NATO now as
"conducive to the democratization of the armed
forces" .lit7
The Alliance should take the role of a vehicle
to foster the

modernization of the military and in providing the armed
forces

a

new ideological base and

a

new place in society:

defending the Spanish territory against outside aggression,
as opposed to the former internal orientation.
In May 1982,

Spain joined the Alliance, but

a

few

months later, the parliamentary elections brought the
Socialist government of Felipe Gonzales into power, who

promised

referendum on the issue. Gonzales opposed

a

Spanish entry,

a

regarding the strong public opposition

against an integration in NATO. He argued that the entry
into the Alliance would undermine the development of an

autonomous foreign policy, that the dependence on the United
States would increase. His fear was

a

vision of Spain drawn

into the pattern of the East-West conflict.

However,

performed

a

after several months in power, Gonzales

U-turn on NATO. The government now put more

emphasis on the strategic importance and the territorial
155 / Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.156
82

security. Gonzales now stated that
the bilateral agreement
wrth the United States would not
provide as much security as
the Alliance. Furthermore, he
approved Soleto's position,
who stressed the modernizing factor
of NATO. The problem for
Gonzales was to convince his party and
the public of his
conversion. The delay of the referendum
which was held in
1986 indicated his difficulties in doing
so. 13^ Within
these four years, the PSOE had to perform
a balancing act.
On one side,

strong public resentments against NATO
had to
be eased. On the other side, Gonzales
still had to support
an integration into the Alliance, in
order to show

enthusiasm for European cooperation in the realm
of the
complicated accession negotiations for the EC.
While there was no formal connection between

a

Spanish

membership in NATO and an accession into the EC, the
two
organizations are psychologically intertwined. As the former
German Minister of State Alois Mertes stated in 1982,
We cannot pretend a Spain which contributes
to the defense of the West should be deprived of
its economic benefits".—7
.

.

.

While NATO provides for the security of the continent, the
EC provides economic benefits. Thus,

if Spain would become a

part of the security mechanism and therefore contribute to
the defense of Europe,

it would be hard for the EC to

156 / see: Edward Moxon-Browne,
157 / in:

Eusebio Mujal-Leon,

1989,

1983,
83

p.87

p.117

justify

a

benefits

.112/

refusal to give the country
its economic

The compromise offered by
Gonzalez was a restricted

NATO- membership based on the
French model, that is to say
with no integration into military
planning and with no
nuclear weapons on Spanish territory.^
NATO membership
was finally approved by 52 per
cent of the electorate in
February 1986.

The second keystone of the Spanish
security was

represented in

number of institutional arrangements
to
satisfy the claims for autonomy by
the several regions. A
section in the Constitution was devoted
to the regions'
autonomy. In Catalonia and in the Basque
country separate
regional governments existed as early as
1980, with their
own regional institutions, giving respect
to the regions'
different languages and national identities.
Furthermore,
a

the central government fosters an economic
autonomy. The

Basque government has the right to levy taxes. While
the tax
rates are identical with the rest of Spain, only
one-third

15_8/

In this context one might argue that the case
of France
shows that a membership in NATO is not an essential
requirement for an accession to the EC. But although
France is not a member in NATO, it nevertheless
contributes significantly to the European security
through its military bases in the south-western part of
Germany

159 / in: Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,
84

p.87

of the taxes from the Basque
country goes to Madrid.
By
1983, the Madrid government
had been granted a status
of
autonomy to seventeen regions,
each with their own

parliament,

Third,

took

supreme court and civil service.

in fighting terrorism,

the Spanish government

variety of actions. In terms of
anti-terrorist
legislation a state of siege could
be declared by the
parliament in the event of an insurrection
a

or act of force

against the sovereignty or independence
of Spain, its
territorial integrity or its institutional
order.

Constitutional rights could be temporarily
suspended .Hi
In addition, Spain tried to make
the security forces more
effective in their fight against political
violence.
7

Furthermore, through cooperation with France
the government
hoped to eliminate the French territory as
a base and refuge
for ETA operations.—7

Fourth,

the integration into the European Community

accounted for an economic development which stabilized
the
formerly fragile economy .— The Community realized
that

economic issues could not be separated from security
160 / Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,

p.56

Edward Moxon-Browne,

1989,

p.58

161

/

162 / see also chapter IV. A.

163 / see also chapter IV. A.
85

aspects,

m

Dublin in September 1984

~
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,

the ten Heads of

......... ... ...
economic affair. -n The
community, although
basically an
economic organization, has a
strong impact on a
nation «s
security. Apart from a
prospering economy which
secures a
democratic transition the
organization provides

„

an arena for

political cooperation and
consultation among its members.
Also, being incorporated
into a community of
democratic
countries accounts for an
additional feature of a security
frame. In the era preceding
World War II no democratic
country in Europe had challenged
the land border
of its

democratic neighbor.

——Zhs
l-i

—Intern al

Trans ition of Portugal

and External Threats

Besides the significant threat that the
military
imposed on the process of democrat izat
ion
Portugal was
confronted with an active and initially
popular Communist
party. The Portuguese Communist Party
,

(CPP)

was the "most

hard-line, pro Soviet in Western Europe".—/
its leader,
Alvaro Cunhal spent several years in exile
in

!£!/ in: Benny Pollack,

p.139

1987,

165 / see chapter II.

166 / Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.38
86

Czechoslovakia. He opposed the de-Stalinisat
ion processes
and identified with hardliners in the
Kremlin. Tactical
considerations on how to gain power determined
his political
behavior

During the first months after the coup,
the Soviet
Union was impressed by Cunhal and his chances
of gaining
power and support among the public. This positive
evaluation
of a likely chance that communists could
control
the

political scene was fostered by the composition of
the
various provisional governments. From September

1974 until

November 1975 radical AFM officers and the Prime
Minister
Colonel Vasco Gonzales were affiliated with the communist

party and largely directed the politics from the third to
the fifth provisional government.—7 Thus, the Soviet

Union gave the CPP unqualified support while seeking their
chances of establishing

a

communist - inf luenced government in

the backyard of NATO. Ten million dollars per month were

transferred from Moscow to the headquarters of the

CPP.Ci^-7

The significance however of the communist party

gradually decreased. Within the military, General Eanes and
the forces committed to a democratic regime gained more and

167 / for further information on composition of the

provisional governments and the political struggle for
power in the aftermath of the coup see:
Walter C.Opello, 1985, p.65-80
168 / in: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.41
87

more control over the situation, culminating
in the removal
of Gonzales and other radical officers from
positions of

power in the fall of 1975. With Secretary of State
Henry
Kissinger regarding Portugal as a crucial sphere
of

interest,

the Soviet Union heavily reduced its support

1697

Although access to government al positions had been
denied after 1976, public support for the Communist party
and other left wing organizations remains considerable

and the political left established itself as
force in

a

112/

political

a

Marxist tradition that regards the transformation

of Portugal into a communist society as its utmost goal. But
so far,

the communist movement does not represent

a

cogent

threat to the democratic system.

A third internal threat to the democratic transition is

caused by an apathy in the Portuguese society towards the

political process. The participation of significant parts of
the population in the decision making process is lacking.
The parties in Portugal remain "bureaucratic, hierarchical

169 / For a further discussion on the US-Soviet relation over
Portugal see chapter IV. B.
170 / In the general elections of 1977 the CPP cast 14,35%
of the votes. In later elections, the CPP formed a
coalition together with other left-wing parties. The
1991:8,8%
1987: 12,14%,
percentages: 1980: 19%,
in:

Europa Yearbook,

1977,
1988,

Vol.I,
p.1048,
Vol.II, p.2217,

1980,
1992,
88

Vol.I,
p.1045
Vol.II, p.2280

and Lisbon oriented"

.HI'

The electoral law enacted
in

.

December 1974 divided the country into
24 local districts.
The party-lists for each district
are set up by the

headquarters in the capital. Thus, the
relationship between
the voters and the candidate are
abstract, for the elector
chooses a party list and not an individual .Hi'
Also,

the phenomenon of "personalismo"
contributed to

the attitude of apathy towards the
political process.

"Personalismo" can be defined as "the predominance
of
individual or personal interests and actions
over collective
or national interests and actions". ill The
pursuing
7

of

self-centered interests, particularly on the bureaucratic
level and among political parties over general
interests is

common in the Portuguese society and deeply based in

cultural tradition .Hi

7

As a result of "personalismo",

a

system of patronage

overshadowed the formation of the first democratic
governments. Although Portugal did not reach "Italian

standards

,

of corruption and personal linkages,

the various

parties in government tried to create power bases by

appointing government supporters to bureaucratic posts.—
171

/

Tom Gallagher,

172 / see:

Tom Gallagher,

173 / Douglas Wheeler,
174

/

p.206

1985,

1985,

1983,

see: Douglas Wheeler,

175 / see:

Tom Gallagher,

p.206

p.342
1983,

1985,
89

pp.342

p.209

7

In short,

internal democracy and free expression
was still
lacking in the Portuguese party system
and keep popular
involvement on a low scale.
A further consequence of "personalismo"
is the loyalty
to persons or personalities rather than
to institutions or
ideas
This kind of uncritical devotion to
one

particular person has strong cultural roots.

"

Sebast ianism"

which can be described as "an atavistic, messianic
form of
popular nationalism"—7 traces back to the 16th century,
,

when King Sebastian miraculously disappeared during
an

expedition. This belief, that

a hero,

appear to solve the national crisis is

great man will

a
a

widespread feeling

among the population. The tendency to create personal cults
has an impact on the contemporary Portuguese society. Annual

masses for national heroes, such as King Carlos
1908)

and President Sidonio Pais

I

(died in

(assassinated in 1914)

are

still being held.

Although such myths are not uncommon in most countries,
in Portugal they result in a growing "Salazar"- cult,

referring to the country's dictator from 1932 to 1968

combined with

glorification of the achievements of his

a

dictatorship .—

7

The impact of history,

176 / see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.342
Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.209
177 / Douglas Wheeler,

1983,

178 / see: Douglas Wheeler,

p.343
1983,
90

p.364

of kings,

rulers

or even dictators who brought a certain
fame to the nation

should not be neglected in the evaluation of
the

contemporary attitude among the Portuguese
population
towards their new system. It is this fame and
glory which
serves as the gauge for the performance of politicians

and

for the democracy in itself. As Douglas Wheeler
noted,

(Portugal is)

"a country where historical memories have
an

ancient pedigree".—''

Despite high electoral turnouts between 78 and 92 per
cent in the general elections between 1975 and 1980, the

public remained skeptical towards the capability of

democracy to solve the country's problems. In the post-

revolutionary period, the new systom was held responsible
for a declining economy and for providing "a license for

communist skulduggery".—''
Here Portugal faces

a

complex problem, grounded in 50

years of authoritarian rule. The dictatorship left people

ill-equipped for democracy and political participation.

Apathy towards the political process and

a

focus on the

personal environment, on the family and the job were common
habits in the Salazar regime. Non-participation was further

fostered by the high rate of illiteracy

cent—

7
)

(at

least 25 per

and a lack of education. The alteration of these

179 / Douglas Wheeler,

1983,

p.363

180 / Douglas Wheeler,

1983,

p.353

181 / Douglas Wheeler,

1983,

p.352
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patterns of behavior, both on the individual level
as well
as in the realm of internal party democracy is
a long-term

process. The appreciation of democracy among the
population,
the participation of broad parts of the society in
the

political process so far still stands in opposition to
traditional modes of behavior and attitudes.
These factors, combined or separated can generate

a

popular and broadly based rejection of democracy and can
serve as a hotbed for populist movements and

a

return to

authoritarian rule. The incorporation of the masses in the
political process and

a

more critical mentality towards

political elites need to be developed. Although almost
twenty years have been passed since the implementation of

a

new political system, the preparation of the mass public for

democracy is as yet incomplete. Only if Portugal is able to
show that

a

democratic society has the capabilities to solve

social and economic tensions,

a

responsive attitude can

emerge where people realize that it "pays off" to

participate in and to contribute to the democratic process.
This will eventually transform into

a

gradual departure from

political apathy.

As a fourth internal threat,

the economic performance

of Portugal hampered the democratic transition. As in the

case of Spain, Portugal faced an unfavorable international

economic climate in the initial period after the revolution.
92

Due to a worldwide recession, the capabilities to attract

international investment and to reduce inflation were
limited. With a limited range of products, Portuguese

industry was not competitive abroad. Regarding the area of
farm products for instance, only wine and tomatoes undersold

European competitors.—
In addition,

7

having no natural resources, the country

has to import all of its fuel needs.—7 The impact of two

years of revolutionary struggle between civilians and the
army,

between left and right and with provisional

governments in various political shades were heavy. When the
first freely elected government under Mario Soarez came into

power in 1976, Portugal's annual trade deficit amounted to
two billion dollars, the budget deficit was one billion

dollar and its foreign debt was over two billion

dollars.— From 1974 to 1976 Portugal had borrowed more
7

than three billion dollars and used up one billion dollars
of its foreign exchange reserves.—

7

The industrial sector was a disaster. The nationalized

industries were largely divided into two groups: the big

monopolies and

182 / Economist,

a

number of small firms. The former were

May 28,

Survey p.20

1977,

183 / see: Tom Gallagher,

1985,

p.217

184 / see: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.119

185 / Economist,

May 28,

1977,

survey, p.22
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basically concentrated in the shipbuilding and
cement
manufacture, two fields which provided for the
economic boom
in the I960 's. But with the worldwide
recession these

branches could not contribute to large foreign
currency
earnings which are vital for an economic recovery.—
The
smaller companies also did not make much profit,
either

because of bad management during the two years of
revolution, while they were managed by worker cooperatives
or because they have been rescued by the state from

bankruptcy

.If! 7

As a result,

the only chance for an investment revival

lay in the private sector,

for it was basically concentrated

in areas where Portuguese products were still

internationally competitive, such as canned food and

textiles.— This was precisely the ambivalence that the
7

Portuguese economy had to face. An economic policy that
fostered the private sector and gave benefits to domestic

entrepreneurs and further attracted foreign investment

contradicted major concerns of the governing socialist
party,

such as education or health care.

Thus,

the revival of private investment and the

involvement of international financial sources was slow and
hesitating, due to the uncertainty over the Socialists

186 / see: Robert Harvey,

1979,

p.120

Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.212

188 / see: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.121

187 / see:
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intention and policies. As

a

result of the revolution, the

state controlled the entire banking sector.
It lacked

specialization and skill in credit management while
the
efficiency was lowered by bureaucratic procedures^7
which
were typical for the Portuguese society. In addition,

banks

suffered from

a

lack of confidence due to a labor action in

1975 that seized some banks while accounts were
publicized

and examined.

Unemployment added to the various economic problems.
Under the dictatorship, there existed
employment, but
low,

a

a

high rate of under-

low rate of wholly unemployed. Wages were

but most families occupied several jobs which provided

for a fair living. After the revolution underemployment

turned into heavy unemployment. Under the Salazar regime,

unemployment had simply been exported to

a

booming Europe.

Up to 1.5 million people went abroad and provided their

families regular financial support. With a worldwide
recession, most emigrants returned to Portugal, thus

increasing the unemployment problem and decreasing the

purchasing power due to

a

missing income. In addition,

a

total of about one million refugees from Angola and

Mozambique had to be integrated into the economy.— Half
7

of them were under sixteen and were just about to enter or

had recently entered the labor market.
May 28,

1977,

survey p.23

190 / in: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.126

189 / Economist,
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Table

3

.

Economic Data on Portugal

unemployment
1975:
1977:
1978:
1981:
1984:
1985:

inflation

10,0
16,0
12,5
7,6
10,8
11,0

June
June
August
June
June
June

Trade Balance:

1976:
1977:
1978:
1980:
1984:
1985:

-

:

-2.506

-1.499

:

-5 .194

-2 850
-1 686

:

-3.084
-1.504

:

12,0
36,0
22,0
16,6
29,3
19,3

Current Balance:

-1 670

1975
1977
1981
1983:
1985

in per cent

.

817
.

.

386

GDP at constant 1977 prices
1977
1979
1981
1983
1984
1985

5

.

6

.

in million US$

in million US$

1.3
-0.3
-1

.

3.3

average 1977-86: 2.9

sources
Europa Yearbook, Vol.I,

Vol.I,
1976, p 1015
1977, p 1029
Vol.I,
Vol.I,
1978, p 1045
1979, p 1032
Vol.II, 1986, p.2164
OECD Economic Surveys, November 1976, p.22, July 1979, p.18
June
1984, p 36
1987/88,
p.102
.

.

.

.

.

The conditions for an economic recovery were critical
for the new democratic system (see also Table 3.)
96

.

The

Soarez Government walked a thin line between the

implementation of economic policies for recovery and
social
unrest caused by the high rates of unemployment and
inflation as well as the soaring costs of living which
more
than doubled between 1975 and 1977. 12I The Socialist
7

government introduced

a

variety of austerity measures to

reorganize the economy. In 1977, Portugal devaluated the
Escudo by 15 per cent and established price controls on

essential food items,

import restrictions on luxury and non-

essential goods, as well as tax incentives for exporters and
incentives for private savings. Also, measures were taken to
reduce public spending.—

7

In 1983,

Soarez announced an

eighteen-month emergency program which included

a

reduction

of state subsidies and the opening of the banking and

insurance sectors for private investment.—7
The ability of the democratic government to ease social

tension and to offer prospects for an economic recovery

determined the fate of the democratic system for the army
was prepared to regain political control in case of

a

further deterioration of the economic and social conditions.

Under the impact of such

a

severe economic malaise,

it was

not surprising that Portugal sought admission into the EC as

191 / Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.131

192 / Europa, Vol.I,

1978,

p.1045

193 / Europa, Vol.II,

1986,

p.2164
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early as March 1977. This step by Prime Minister
Soarez had
the full support of all democratic parties.^7
As in the case of Spain,

it was a generally accepted

assumption that modernization of the industries and the

desperately needed foreign investments could only be reached
through an incorporation within the Community. The prospect
of a membership within the EC was seen as vital for an

economic recovery and thus for the stabilization of

democracy
As with its Iberian neighbor, Portugal did not face any

severe external threats. Although excluded from the nuclear

planning group of NATO in the first years after the coup of
1974,

neither Portugal nor the other member states

questioned the importance of its membership in the Alliance.
The heavy financial support of the Soviet Union to the

communist party did not further develop in any guerilla
activity, terrorism or revolutionary attacks to the

democratic regime. The incorporation into NATO with the
strategic importance of Portugal for the Alliance prevented
any outside intervention or aggression.

194 / see: Economist,

May 28,

1977,
98

survey p.29
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The New Portuguese Security Policy

NATO represents the security-bedrock of the
Portuguese
Democracy. While Spain under Franco was confronted
with

political and economic isolation and unable to form ties
with the western world, Portugal joined the Alliance in
1949
at its creation.

In the 1960 's the country turned its

economy towards Europe, by becoming

a

founding member of the

European Free Trade Association. Therefore, its linkages
with the West were already established at the outbreak of
the Revolution. Military cooperation within NATO represents
a

traditional cornerstone of the security of post-war

Portugal, while the radical departure from colonialism in
the mid 1970

's

further enhanced the western orientation of

Portuguese politics.

From

a

geo-political point of view the separate entity

of the Iberian region should suggest close cooperation with

Spain. However, each of the two countries has its own

separate identity and cooperation is almost absent in modern
history, a situation which Bernardo Futscher Pereira

described as "a long ingrained habit of turning their backs
to each other"

.—

7

However, with two authoritarian regimes

in power on the Iberian peninsula,

Salazar formed

a

the dictators Franco and

loose alliance of moral and ideological

support. But with democracy on the rise, historical
195/ Bernardo Futscher Pereira,
99

1986,

p.64

resentments and defiance emerged again. It was
not until the
common application to the EC that relations

improved. Issues

of trade and fishery which deadlocked
negotiations for a

further cooperation had to be clarified and
settled in order
to reach an accession.—

7

But the geopolitical position

and an almost parallel transition to democratic rule
did not

further develop in a "special relationship" of cooperation.

The impetus of the EC in reducing the Spanish-

Portuguese antagonism indicates the impact, which the

Community has on Portuguese politics. The EC with its
prospect for economic recovery, political stability, and
security serves as the second cornerstone to the new

Portuguese security concept
The accession into the Community represented the third

and final step to complete the "European connection"

aftermath of the second World War, Portugal was
member of NATO and consequently began

a

a

.

In the

founding

process of opening

towards Europe as well as towards North America. The

membership in the European Free Trade Association in 1967
further enhanced this development. The decision to join the

European Community represented the final departure from old
colonial politics. The country used to be caught between two
vises,

that of Africa and that of Europe. The future however

196 / see: Bernardo Futscher Pereira,
100

1986,

p.81-84

was seen by all major parties exclusively in the realm
of

western-European democracies

197 / Robert Harvey,

1978,

.HZ/

p.74
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

A.

—Th®

-iL-i

The Case of Spain

incorporation of the Military Apparatus

With the incorporation into the North Atlantic
Alliance, the internal threat of the military apparatus
ceased. In addition,

Spain and France entered into a

comprehensive military agreement in November 1983, covering
joint areas production, training and the sharing of

facilities for ships, aircraft and transport. At the end of
the Hispano-French seminar in Leon in October 1988, the two

Foreign ministers agreed on

a

further coordination of

external action in Latin America, the Middle East and

Eastern Europe.— Furthermore, West Germany and Spain
7

established working groups on multilateral security
activities. All these actions helped integrating the Spanish

military into the international community and provided the

Armed Forces with

a

new task and ideological base.

The democratic transition changed the Spanish-American

relation. Neither country needed the other as much as in
1953 when the United States financially supported the Franco

regime in order to have the strategic advantage of military

bases on the peninsula. Relations were further clouded by
198 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse,
102

1991,

p.105

a

strong anti-Americanism among the population,
expressed by
Jose Antonio Soler, host of the popular TV-show
"Buenos
Dias"
had no American troops liberating us and
no Marshall Plan. All we saw was Eisenhower
embracing Franco"

'We

In the aftermath of the coup in 1982,

while European leaders

denounced the terrorist attack on the Spanish parliament,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig seemed to shrug off the

putsch with the remark that it was

a

Spanish internal

matter. Although Haig has not been briefed about the

incident when the press caught him, it further increased the

negative attitude towards the U.S. The rumor that the CIA
knew about the coup was taken for granted by many
Spaniards

.—

7

The distrust of the U.S. among the Spanish people

traces back to the Spanish-American war in 1898 which

essentially resulted in the loss of the Spanish status as
significant European power. In

a

poll taken in May 1985,

per cent of the respondents said they do not regard the

United States as

a

true friend of Spain. 74 percent felt

that American arms policy is

a

danger to peace.—

199 / in: U.S. News and World Report:

7

The

24 March 1986,

200 / see: Ray Alan: "The U.S. and the Coup in Spain"
in: New Leader, April 20, 1981, p.ll

201/ in: Adrian Shubert,

1985,

p.672

103

p.30

a
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core of the problem were the four American
air bases. While
access to the bases played a major role in
American

considerations

,

Spain remained skeptical towards

a

foreign

power on its territory. The base agreement was regarded
as
left over from the Franco regime

.

a

221/

Finally in 1988, the two nations agreed to deploy the
72 F-16 bombers by 1991.

Spain was willing to pay 50 percent

of the costs of approximately one billion dollars,

while it

also bought 73 F-18 bombers from the United States to

improve its defense and to account for the loss in the NATO

defense structure .^/ With the American forces leaving
Spanish ground, the emphasis in the post— Franco era was now
the security of U.S. investments and the preservation of

democratic institutions. The Spanish orientation shifted
from America to Europe.

Still,

providing

a

the United States played a helping role in

proper Spanish security. Apart from the

enthusiasm towards Spanish membership in NATO, the U.S. gave
heavy financial assistance to reorganize the Spanish

202 / Economist: January 23,
203 / Time,

January 25,

1988,

1988,

p.47
104

p.41

military

This process helped Spain achieve
the

technological standards required by NATO.

2,

Internal Threats
A closer cooperation with France was necessary
in order

to gain control over Spain's major terrorist
problem ETA.

For logistical reasons, France had been a traditional

operational base for ETA. The Basque provinces of Spain are

separated from France by the Pyrenees. ETA often used the
inaccessible territory to carry out terrorist attacks and

retreated across the border into France. ETA's struggle
against the Franco regime encouraged French tolerance but as

terrorism endangered the Spanish democratic system, Paris
began to collaborate with Madrid. The two countries reached
a

bilateral accord in 1983 with increasing police and

judicial action.

Although terrorism continues to

204 / The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency
for International Development)
in 1976 the U.S. provided no loans but $ 0.8 million in
grants:
0.6 for Military education and training
0.2 for Military Assistance Program
in 1977-8: $ 120 million loans, (credit financing)
17 million grants:
$
$ 15 million Mil. Assistance Program
2 million Mil educ
and training
$
in 1979: $ 120 million loans (credit financing)
$ 44.4 million grants:
$ 42.4 million Mil .Ass Program
2 million Mil educ. and training
$
.

.

205 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse,
105

1991,

p.106-108

represent a threat to the Spanish security,
the support of
France is essential in handling this issue.
The Spanish fight against political violence
further

benefitted from the integration into Europe. Spain
participates in the Trevi Group, which consists of the
Interior and Justice Ministers and the police chiefs
of the
twelve EC countries. The Group is designed to coordinate

cooperation among police and intelligence agencies

Foremost,

206 /
.

admission into the European Community gave

Spain the opportunity of economic development, thus

stabilizing social peace and providing an arena for
political cooperation and consultation. A closer look at the
Spanish industrial output underlines the positive impact of
the EC for the Spanish economic recovery. The GNP per head

rose over 250 per cent from 3,520 US$ per head (in real
terms)

in 1976 to 9,150 US$ in

1989.—

7

Unemployment however continued to be

a

serious problem.

It has grown inexorably from eight per cent in 1978 to 22

per cent in 1986, while the figure of 1991 was 15 per cent.

Government policies could not cure this Spanish disease,
which arose due to the restructuring of the heavily

overstaffed industries of the Franco-era, in order to gain
competitive position on the world market.
206 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse,
207 / Europa, Vol.II,

1991,

p.2408
106

1991,

p.106

a

In 1977 Spain applied for membership
within the

European Community. With the restoration of
democracy, the
country fulfilled a fundamental prerequisite
and the

European Parliament gave support for an accession
the negotiations which started in 1979 stretched

But
out over a

period of six years. The difficulties here were
based on
economic factors. This was particularly disappointing
to

Spain. Especially in the early 1980

's,

with

a

number of coup

attempts endangering the democracy, the country's hope
for

a

quicker incorporation which would have provided an extra
security was in vain.
The basic problem was the period of adaptation for the

Spanish economy. Spain favored

a short

its competitive agricultural products,

amount of time for

while demanding

a

longer period to adjust own protective tariffs for the weak

domestic industrial sectors. Other problems were fishing,
the free movement of labor and financial and budgetary

matters. Especially France -a competitor with Spanish

agricultural products- blocked the negotiations and

virtually deadlocked them between 1980 and 1981.—7
It was a political dimension that brought the

negotiations back on track. When the election of 1982 placed
the Spanish Socialist party PSOE in power, the country

quickly began to question its NATO membership which it
208 / see: Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.138

209 / see: Benny Pollack,

1987,

p.139
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joined under the Christian Democratic
government of the UCD
1 98 1
This debate was a major political issue
that

m

.

—

"

intensified after the PSOE declared its 180-degree-

turnaround-policy which was now in favor of the Alliance.
In
September 1984 the ten Foreign Ministers of the European
Community met in Dublin for an extraordinary meeting.
With
the 30th congress of the PSOE just three months ahead,

the

Community was aware that further delays in the negotiations
might affect the current supporting attitude of the PSOE

towards NATO. Suddenly the Community added

a

political

dimension to the economic integration of Spain into Europe.
In Dublin,

the Foreign Ministers agreed on the basis for the

accession— and nine months later
7

in June 1985 the treaty

was signed.
By that time, Europe had gained outstanding economic

importance for Spain

.

212/

From Franco's death in 1975 until

210 / see chapter III.B.2
211 / see: Benny Pollack,

212/

p.140

1987,

Spanish Foreign Trade in

of Total

%

Imports
1975

USA
West-Germany
France
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
sources

15

.

10.3
8.3
5.3
5.2
2.7
:

Exports
1985
10
10

.

.

6

9.3
10
4

1985

10.5
10.7
13.7

9.9
9.6
15.5
8.6
7.0
8.0

.

7

.

3.4

3.8

Europa Yearbook,

1975

.

4

.

p.1101
1976, Vol .1,
1986, Vol .11, p 2428
.
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the accession a decade later trade
relations had steadily
increased. In 1983 half of the Spanish exports
went to
Europe,
I

975

-—

a

nominal increase of 670 per cent compared
to

In addition,

64

per cent of imported capital

goods originated in the community, with France
(25.7 per
cent of all Spanish imports)

and West Germany

(29.6 per

providing for the major trading partners. Furthermore,

cent)

the EC and its member states replaced the United States
in

terms of a source of foreign investment for Spain. In 1975
the U.S. accounted for 40.6 and the EC for 35.6 per cent,

while in 1983 the figures were 11.7 and 51 per cent.
In 1985 Spain was in fact already economically

incorporated in Europe. Only the institutional base of

a

full membership was missing. The path that the country has

chosen was already irreversible: from an autarky to

a

modern

market economy embedded in the European Community. But
still,

the long process of accession left the country open

to disturbances. The number of coups and a stumbling economy

endangered the stabilization of democracy.
In 1985,

the EC supplied Spain with a pre-accession

grant of 550 Million ECU.—' Considering the variety of

economic problems and political turmoil this amount might
seem limited. But in nominal terms it represented

213 / in: Benny Pollack,

1987,

214 / in: Europe Yearbook,

p.140

Vol.II,
109

1986,

p.2369

a

significant portion of the EC budget and
clearly indicated
the Community's commitment to help Spain
reorganizing and

restructuring its economy. Still, the process of
accession
dragged over a period of nine years until the
European
vocation of the democratic-modernizers had been
realized and
Spain, together with Portugal joined the Community
on 1
January 1986.

During the era of General Franco the United States was
the main financial supporter of the regime. The mutual

agreement between the two states in this period can be

described as "money for strategy”. With the democratic
transition the relation was reduced to

determination against

a

a

united

communist threat.

After Franco's death the U.S. had

a

concern for the

security of U.S. investments. Also, in order to avoid

a

strategic security gap, the establishment of stable

democratic institutions and the continuing access to its
military bases in Spain was in the American interest.—7
These concerns however, did not result in a significant

economic assistance. In the period before Franco's demise,
the United States granted Spain three million dollars

annually.—

7

In the insecure and in retrospect

215 / Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy,

1984,

p.152

216 / Figures according to "AID" (Agency for International
Development), Washington D.C.
110

unpredictable year of 1976, financial support
stopped. In
1977 however,

grants of US$ ten million and from 1978 to

1980 US$ seven million annually of economic
assistance were

given to Spain. Still, the figures indicate, that
the United
States preferred to hand over the responsibility to
Europe.

Europe more and more replaced the United States. The

increasing trade relations and the process of

a

political

and economic incorporation into the European Community had
no comparable American counterweight,

resulting in the

stabilization of trade relations on

lower level.—7

a

The Spanish-American connection after World War II can

also be described as "a matter of security and expediency,
not an alliance"

The character of this relation was

still valid after Franco's death. The United States'

strategic and security concerns were eased through an

extension of the 1976 base-agreement and eventually with the
integration of Spain into NATO

heavily fostered by the U.S

- a

.—

political step that was

The integration process

into the European Community provided for the establishment
of a democratic system,

which secured U.S. investments and

217 / In 1973 Spain exported 13.8% of its goods to the U.S.
In 1983 the figure dropped to 7.3%. Imports also
decreased from 16% in 1973 to 11.9% a decade later,
in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.I,
1978, p.1117
Vol.II, 1986, p 2369
.

218 / Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy,
219 / see chapter III.B.2
111

1984,

p.135

further safeguarded strategic concerns in
the age of the
Cold War. In addition, an EC membership
accounted for the

implementation of

a

market economy which offered investment

opportunities. Thus, the vital interests of the
United
States in Spain were secured by Europe. There was
no need
for a distinctive financial engagement

Additional financial commitments from the United States
were further hampered by the critical bilateral

relationship. The quarrels over base negotiations and

diverging opinion on Latin American issues, such as the
Falklands War and U.S. policies on Nicaragua and El Salvador

weakened the former strong ties.
In short,

the Spanish transition was appreciated, but

an active engagement and a fostering of a positive economic

climate was hardly supported

- a

continuation of the

expedient relation.

B.
1

.

The Case of Portugal

The Incorporation of the Military Apparatus
In reducing the internal threat which the military

imposed on the establishment of
powers took

a

a

democratic regime, outside

variety of actions. In early 1975, with the

background of an unstable political situation and with
communists possessing posts of political power, Portugal was
112

excluded from NATO's nuclear planning group
which had access
to highly classified material. But the
actual membership of
Portugal in the Alliance was never questioned.
The United
States had an air base at Lajes in the Azores
as
well as an

underwater terminal to monitor Soviet submarine
movements.
Thus,

Portugal was of vital strategical importance for
NATO.
The state of a partial exclusion from NATO organs
was
only

temporary. A return to an entire incorporation followed
with
the emergence of a reliable democratic regime.

NATO helped Portugal and in particular President Eanes
in their efforts to promote a new ideological base for
the

armed forces
a

.

As opposed to the colonial imperial past with

heavy military involvement in Africa, the emphasis was now

on the defense of western Europe and the securing of the

democratic regime. In order to pursue this new function, the

military needed to be modernized. After the political
situation was settled the West gradually began to update the

technical equipment of Portugal and to provide military

training
Again, the leading role in Europe was played by the

Federal Republic of Germany. With the Social Democratic

party (SPD)

in power,

West Germany accounted for an arms

transfers of US$ 100 million between 1976 and 1980. While
the U.S. also contributed to the modernization, the role of
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France and Great Britain was only minor
the United States provided

a

in addition,

military assistance of US$ 33.5

million in 1977 and US$ 27.9 million in 1978^ 7

2.

.

Internal Threats
The performance of the Portuguese communist party

created fears among western nations, that the country might
fall under communist influence,

further fostered by the

heavy financial support of the Soviet Union. The responses
to this threat to democracy were as follows.

The United States reacted moderately towards the

changes in Portugal. U.S. military bases and diplomatic

posts were never in danger. While in the case of Chile the

country rushed into helping right-wing soldiers to perform

putsch that would almost certainly have taken place without
any U.S. interference, the Nixon administration was more

cautious in Portugal. With no clear threat to NATO or the

220 / Between 1976 and 1980 France and Great Britian each
provided US$ 5 million.
Source: World Military and Arms Transfers, 1983, p.118
221 / The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency
for International Development)
in 1977 the U.S. provided $ 33.5 million in grants
$ 32.3 million: Military Assistance Program
1.2 million: Military Education and Training
$
in 1978: $ 27.9 million in grants
$ 25.o million: Military Assistance Program
2.9 million: Military Education and Training
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a

U.s.,

Nixon and Kissinger relied on a
policy, that would
allow the democratic forces in the
military as

well as in

other political parties to expose and
counterweight the
communist attempts to seize power. Only
at the peak of the
struggle for power in the "Hot Summer" of
1975 did the
United States respond to the Soviet aid by
ensuring its
support for an evolving democracy. Secretary
of State Henry
Kissinger strengthened the ties with a democratic
Portugal
and explicitly warned the Soviet Union:

Russia should not assume it has the option, either
directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary
to the right of the Portuguese people to determine
their own future The involvement of external pressures
for this purpose in a country which is an old friend
and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of
European security".—7
.

^ith the prospect that the United States would not accept
any further involvement of the Soviet Union in Portuguese
affairs, Moscow reduced its support. For

a

short time,

an

internal threat of a probable communist influence in

Portugal was transferred in the realm of the antagonism of
the cold war. Some reports suggest, that during this time,

power struggle took place in the Kremlin with one faction
around KGB chief Alexander Shelepin being in favor of an

intensified involvement, whereas Brezhnev, following the

222 / in: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.76
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a

policy of "detente", feared that the
situation might get out
of

hand.—

7

Kissinger's strict response and his affirmation
of
supporting democratic principles might have saved
Portugal
from emerging as a conflict zone in the struggle
of

the two

ambivalent military systems. The firm standpoint
of the U.S.
prevented the internal threat of communist participation
in

Portuguese politics from developing into an external
threat
with international involvement. As long as ideological
implications remained in the realm of domestic politics in
Portugal, the involvement of the United States was low. But
as soon as ideology entered the sphere of an international

confrontation in the age of the cold war, the U.S. response
left no doubt about its sphere of influence.

Not only the CPP, but also other political parties

managed to form linkages to foreign political parties.
Immediately after the coup of April 1974, every party in

Portugal attempted to set up grass roots organizations for
the upcoming bid for political power. Thus, the financial

support of political parties from western European countries
to their sister-organizations in Portugal served as a

counter weight to the extensive financial support of the
Soviet Union to the CPP.

223 / see: Robert Harvey,

1978,

p.76
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The West-German Social Democratic
Party

especially active role,

a

(SPD)

took an

position which was inconceivable

for the Federal Republic a few years
before. Chancellor

Helmut Schmidt and party chairman Willy
Brandt were closely
associated with the chairman of the Portuguese
Socialists
Mario Soares through the Socialist International.
Despite
the provision of several million dollars,
advice and

logistical support from the SPD, Schmidt managed to
persuade
the United States that Soares and the Socialists were
the

most reliable democratic force in Portugal and therefore

ensured U.S. assistance as well.ffi

7

The Associated Press reported on 25 September 1975 that

since June the CIA transferred between two and ten million

dollars per month to Soarez' party

Furthermore, minor

contributions to the Portuguese Socialists were given by the
Socialist parties of France and Italy and the Labor Party in
Great Britain.— As far as other political movements are
concerned, the Center Democrats created ties with the

British Conservatives and the French Giscardians. The
Popular Democrats failed to attract attention from any

European Socialist movement and thus decided to refuse any
European connection at all.

224

/

see: Robert Harvey,

225 / in: Kenneth Maxwell,
226 / in: Robert Harvey,

p.73

1978,
1982,

1978,

p.240

p.41
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But no other organization could compete
with the
support given by the various Socialists
parties and in

particular the SPD

.

The German Social Democrats contributed

to a large extent to the manifestation of
democracy and the

establishment of

liable Portuguese democratic force with

a

a

broad public base and support. The internal threat
of

Communism and the initial financial advantage of the
CPP in
establishing a party organization was reduced and eventually

extinguished through the fostering of democratic
alternatives

In 1972 Portugal signed a Free-Trade-Agreement for

industrial products with the European Community. To the
agreement, tariff reductions concerning Portuguese

agricultural exports were annexed. The document was enlarged
in 1976 by making provision for dismantling trade barriers

for exports from the EC to Portugal and covering new areas

such as technology,

financial aid and the positions of

migrant workers.—7 Thus,

in 1972,

prior to the Revolution

and furthermore in 1976 Portugal created strong ties to

Europe
In addition,

Great Britain joined the common market in

1972. The United Kingdom was Portugal's most important

foreign market and both countries had been among the states

establishing the European Free Trade Association in 1960.
227/ in: Paulo de Pitta e Cunha,
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1983,

p.321

With its most important trading partner
now incorporated
into the EC, it was vital for Portugal
to further strengthen
its trade relation with the Community.
It was therefore
a

logical step of the First Provisional Government
to ask the
Community for economic support shortly after the coup
in

April 1974.
In November 1974,

presented

a

the Third Provisional Government

proposal for a renewal of trade terms under the

Free Trade— Arrangement

.

The position of the EC towards these

proposals was reluctant. The regime crises in Portugal in
the aftermath of the first coup which culminated in another

military coup in March 1975 did not indicate the commitment
to democracy necessary for financial support of the EC. By

that time, the economic situation in Portugal worsened.—

During Portugal's "Hot Summer" of 1975 the European

Community still followed its reluctant policy concerning
financial support. France vetoed

a

community loan in July

1975 for fear of subsidizing a socialist-communist alliance.

The EC Council of the Heads of State and Government stated

that it could only support a pluralist democracy,—7 thus

denying financial assistance. Although the EC Commission had

proposed immediate economic aid to Portugal— in June
7

228 / see chapter III.C.l

229 / Rainer Eisfeld,

1986,

230/ see: Rainer Eisfeld,

p.31
1986,

119

p.31

1975 it took another four months until
the Community finally
agreed to grant Portugal a US$ 180 million
grant from the

European Investment Bank. By that time,

a

new social-

democratic government had been in power for
three weeks.
Here,

the European Community sent a clear signal,

connecting economic issues to political concerns.
Economic
aid was not granted without a commitment to
democratic
values and the development of democratic institutions
which
forced President Gomes to describe the EC attitude as
imical".-

With moderate Socialists having taken control

within the AFM and

a

new provisional government in power

since November 1975 western nations were more willing to

support the Portuguese economy.
Thus,

in February 1976 West Germany offered credits of

US$ 250 million,

Switzerland and Norway US$ 50 million and

US$ 18 million.—^ Economic assistance further increased

after the first free elections in the summer of 1976. The

more it became obvious that the impact of radicals within
the political process was constantly limited, the more were

foreign powers willing to support Portugal's economic

recovery and therefore its political consolidation. The

United States gave US$ 300 million in credits in February

231 / Rainer Eisfeld,

232 / Lester A.

Sobel,

1986,

1976,

p.32
p.137.
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1977 and the U.S. and West Germany
put together another US$
700 million four months later.

In March 1977,

one year after the new Constitution had

been promulgated, Portugal applied for membership
in the
European Community. In contrast to the first period
of

negotiations with Spain, the EC stressed the political
importance of consolidating democracy in Portugal. The

difference lay in Portugal's membership in NATO. Besides the
economic issue, strategy was at stake. A political

stabilization at the southern flank of the Alliance was
vital for western security. Thus,

strategic and security

considerations were almost "automatically invoked in
arguments about EC policies ".—'
The process of a full integration however, was not to
be completed until 1986. As in the case of Spain, economic

problems over tariffs and competitive products had to be
solved. Also comparable with its Iberian neighbor was the

Community's financial support. The EC showed

a

distinctive

commitment to integrate Portugal. The accession negotiations

accounted for the provision of
paid over

a

a

grant of 700 million ECU,

period of ten years following 1986, in order to

modernize Portuguese agriculture.—7
233 / Robert Harvey,
234 / Rainer Eisfeld,
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Portugal benefited from the
incorporation into the
Community. Since 1986, the country's
GNP has grown at an
annual rate of 4.3 per cent. The
unemployment

rate of four

per cent is the lowest in the EC.
This was due in part of
the helping hand of the EC in
restructuring the industrial
and agrarian sectors. But also, the
economic policies of the
new government of Cavaco Silva, which
took office in late

fostered this positive tendency. Silva is
committed to
an increasing role of private enterprises
and to reducing
the levels of unemployment and inflation.
Portugal emerged
1985,

as an attractive haven for foreign investment
due to its

low cost and ultra— product ive labor force"—7

.

Portugal

took advantage of the free flow of capital and
the reduction
of trade barriers,

conditions made possible with EC

integration

Similar to their policies in Spain, the United States

regarded Europe as the main responsible actor in the process
of stabilizing the democratic regime in Portugal. But

furthermore, the U.S. regarded Portugal in terms of the

East-West ambivalence and felt very sensitive to eventual
communist influence in the post-authoritarian regimes. Thus,

economic assistance was heavy after it became obvious that
Portugal was following

a

model of western-type democracies.

236 / in: Forbes Magazine, April 27,
122

1992,

p.118

Similar to the Community, the
United States connected
financial aid to political commitment.
In 1974 no economic
assistance at all was given to Portugal.
The figures
steadily increased from US$ 15 million
in
1975

million in loans) to US$ 338 million
in 1978
loans)

(US$

14.3

(only

it was a clear policy by the
United States:

foster the economy of

a

to

democratic Portugal and thus to

stabilize the democratic transformation
in order to secure
the Southern European flank of the
western security system

237 / The figures are according to "AID"

International Development)
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(Agency for

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE

What remains to be done by outside powers
to provide
Eastern Europe with a proper security? As seen
in the

previous chapters, the examples of the transition
period of
Spain and Portugal show important similarities
to the

current situation in Eastern Europe, which can be
employed
as a useful background in the search for the
establishment

of stable democratic systems.

A.

Incorporating the Military

Apparatus into Society
The status of the civil-military relations in Eastern

Europe shows remarkable similarities between the three
countries. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,

constitutional arrangements provide for

a

solid civil

supremacy. The armed forces are given an autonomous realm in

strictly military matters, such as training and recruitment
in order to maintain their combat capabilities. The newly

established military academies, responsible for education
and training of future officers, are under military

supervision. Each country took measures to eliminate the

communist impact on the apparatus and all three countries
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based their new military doctrine on
the defense of the
nation
In addition,

Eastern Europe reduced its armies. The

reductions seemed useful, for the defensive
orientation of
the new military doctrine as well as the
absence
of an

ideological enemy makes large armies obsolete.
Within the
stringent economic situation, it further relieves
the

states' budgets. Also,

a

reduction in size decreases the

essential costs necessary for the provision of

a

decent

material standard for the individual soldier.
In comparison,

the two Iberian nations responded

similarly to possible internal military threats. Both Spain
and Portugal undertook severe reductions in force. They also

tried to eliminate certain political-ideological influences
on the army

.

were ousted.

In the case of Spain,
In Portugal,

former Franco officers

radical officers had to leave the

forces
In addition,

the promulgation of new constitutions

enhanced civil supremacy with the special case of Portugal,
where the military has

a

politics. General Eanes,

traditional tendency to interact in
although

a

pro-democratic officer,

symbolized the involvement of the military by holding the
powerful position of the President until 1986.
But the essential malfunction in the civil-military

relations in Eastern Europe is in the cognitive aspect, the
need to make the armed forces feel integrated within the new
125

society.

In terms of a new military
doctrine all three

countries emphasize the defending of the
nation. In the case
of Poland the military also stresses
the long military
tradition mixed with a certain amount of
national

pride. But

the military in all of Eastern Europe is
confronted with a
skeptical population. The public attitude
towards the army
is shaped by forty years of communism,
in which the military
-although curtailed- never challenged the regimes
and was

reduced to

a

political actor of minimal influence. This lack

in public support represents a cognitive
deficit in the

identities of the Eastern European militaries. As yet they
do not feel integrated and respected as a vital
element of a

democratic system. This perception has the potency to

transform into an alienation of the apparatus from society,
which can generate into an internal challenge and threat to
the democratic system.
The Iberian cases serve as useful comparisons. Spain

gives a rich example on how to integrate the armed forces
and on how to provide them with a new ideological base. The

Spanish armed forces were largely segregated from the

democratization process in society. It kept its old
traditions and values and was not able to adapt to the rapid
cultural and political transformation. But NATO served as

partial solution. The army was incorporated into an

institution that provided

a

bedrock for the military

doctrine -the defense of the country within the realm of
126

a

western nations. Furthermore, this newly
found identity
distracted the military from an involvement
in internal

political matters.
As mentioned above, the military in
Portugal has

historical role for political intervention,
while the
Presidency has supreme authority and is traditionally

a

open

to a military officer. Nevertheless, NATO
at least served as
a

buffer,

as an additional arena,

where the military found

an identity and ideological base in contributing
to the

security of the western world.
The situation in Eastern Europe is similar. First,
the

prospect of alienated armies is apparent and second, the

transformation into an open and democratic society has the
tendency to contradict traditional values and attitudes of
the conservative military

mind.—

7

The integration of the armies of Eastern Europe into

a

broader military concept can have the same effect as

compared to the case of the Spanish armed forces. It became
an integral part of the democratic system -as a servant and

not as a threat. The question is whether NATO can provide

the same identity to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as
it did to the Iberian nations.

An entire incorporation into the Alliance would serve
the purpose of an external orientation of the military in
238 / for a discussion on the military mind and ethic see:
Samuel Huntington, 1959, 59-65
Amos Perlmutter, 1977, p.25-40
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the realm of western democracies. But
several aspects
prevent a complete adaptation of the Iberian
experiences.
First, an entire incorporation would leave
the

democratization processes of Russia and the other
republics
of the former Soviet Union isolated. This step
would
represent

a

setback for these nations and an exclusion from

the integration process of Europe,

a

double-edged policy

with two different standards.
Second,

with full integration, NATO and Eastern Europe

would be confronted with additional financial costs due to
an adaptation to NATO— standards in terms of eguipment and

training and the logistical costs to fulfill specific tasks
in the Alliance.

Third,

although the possibility of alienated armies in

Eastern Europe should be taken seriously, the current
situation gives no indications of

a

counterrevolution or

a

further enhanced by the guarantee of civil supremacy

coup,

in terms of institutional and constitutional arrangements.

Portugal and Spain provided

a

cognitive base in an

abrupt way through the help of NATO. The Alliance

represented an ideological transmitter for the Iberian
nations. The urge to integrate the Spanish military was

pressing after various coups. In Portugal, the armed forces

played

a

key role during the revolution and needed to be

distracted from internal politics to give way to democratic
institutions. From the early beginnings of the transition to
128

democracy, the lack of cognitive bases
for the militaries in
both countries represented a threat.
But the situation in Eastern Europe is
different. The

militaries so far have not demanded or attempted
an
involvement in internal politics. Moreover,
they do not
exert a significant influence on the
democratization
processes. Thus, the formation of an identity for
the

Eastern European militaries is not as urgent as it
was in
the cases of the Iberian nations. Therefore, Hungary,
Poland
and Czechoslovakia do not necessarily need a military

organization to offer

a

cognitive base for their armed

forces. The mutual adaptation of the civil and military

sectors of society can be given the necessary time in order
to establish the mutual perception that both sectors are

vital for a secure democracy.
Still,

the sole function of defending the country bears

the danger of an orientation towards internal matters. The

militaries of Eastern Europe are in need of an international
outlook and connection, which is related to their security
function of safeguarding their nations. Here, outside powers
can provide assistance.

International cooperation within the

realm of democratic societies would distract from internal

political matters. It would provide for an exchange with
armies from established democratic societies and would

therefore give the theoretical ideology of defending the
nation

a

practical notion. Mutual exchanges in the field of
129

military education and training, participation
in maneuvers,
technological assistance are among such measures.
The

provision of

new cognitive base is achieved through
an
integration within the western world. In the cases
of Spain
and Portugal, NATO served this purpose. But in
Eastern

Europe,

a

cooperation, assistance, and advice are capable of

fulfilling this function.
As argued in chapter II,

the military needs to be

professional to fulfill its security function. Thus, the
technological standard of the Eastern European armies has to
be upgraded in order to be effective.

In the context of

bilateral cooperation, outside powers should recall the
assistance given to Portugal and Spain. The Carter and
Reagan administrations helped the young democracies in

bringing the military equipment on

a

higher standard and

further financed military-educational training. France

entered into

a

bilateral military agreement with Spain,

while Germany established working groups with Spain and gave
financial assistance for the modernization of the Portuguese

military
One might say that these measures by western powers

were designed to increase the effectiveness of NATO in
general. But they also had a particular impact on Spain and

Portugal. The modernization contributed to the aspect of
identity. New equipment had a psychological effect on the

military,

for it actually benefited from the change in
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regimes. This further fostered
the integration processes
of
the Iberian militaries into the
realm of democratic
societies

Although they are not members of NATO,
this aspect is
nevertheless relevant to the cases of
Eastern Europe.
Financial assistance and cooperation in
the field of
equipment and technology would increase
the effectiveness of
the Eastern European armies and would
make the militaries
more responsive to the new democratic
systems. In addition
it would consolidate contacts and
strengthen ties between
East and West
So far,

the United States provides assistance for

Eastern Europe in the field of military-educational
training.
Spain

A comparison with the assistance given to

(chapter IV. A.

earlier, however,

1)

and Portugal

(chapter IV.B.l)

shows the limited engagement of the United

States in Eastern Europe.

239_/ In the fiscal year 1992,

each of the three Eastern
European countries received an estimated 75,000 US$. In
the fiscal year of 1991, the figures were 310,000 for
Czechoslovakia, 275,000 for Hungary and 407,000 for
Poland; according to "AID"
(Agency for International Development)

240 / The lack of available data on the engagement of the EC
and its member states makes a conclusion on European

outside powers obsolete.
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B.
1

.

Internal Threats

Economic Problems
As discussed above, the consequences of the economic

performances of the particular countries are twofold. The
securance of

a

decent material standard for the individual

soldiers reduces the threat of

a

military intervention.

Also, the distribution of wealth and the provision of

economic benefits to broad sectors of society eases social
tensions. As seen in chapter III.A.l. Eastern Europe is

suffering from various economic setbacks, which hinder the

implementation of

a

market economy. High inflation,

unemployment, price increases and a low industrial output
are the current distinctive marks.

This research is not able to offer solutions in

handling the economic crises. Numerous economists and
western financial expertise discussed and offered various
approaches,

often with only slight success. Instead, this

research hopes to contribute to the discussion through

a

comparative look at Spain and Portugal.
The similarities between Iberia and Eastern Europe are

compelling. Both suffered from their inherited economic
system,

with insufficient structures. In both cases

capitalist management and financial skill were either
limited or absent. Spain and Portugal were dependent on
foreign investment, capital and technology. The two Iberian

nations were not able to consolidate their economies and
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thus to stabilize their regimes without foreign
help. Spain
and Portugal were able to create a "European
connection",

through an increase in trade relations and eventually
with
the accession to the EC. Europe was the safeguard
for
economic recovery and therefore fostered democracy on the
Iberian peninsula.
Today,

the same prospect is valid for Eastern Europe.

Only with the help of outside powers can the region provide
an acceptable material standard so vital for its security

and for the stabilization of democracy.
In Eastern Europe,
a

socialist into

a

the process of a transformation from

capitalist economy is hampered by the

lack of historic experiences which would provide guidance.
It requires western expertise and market experience.

Outside

powers, which include European as well as non— European

nations,

can provide assistance on three levels: sub-

governmental actors, the individual governments and supranational organizations, such as the EC, the IMF or the World
Bank

On the sub-governmental level private enterprises need

to take action. The private sectors of western countries can

arrange technology transfers and joint-venture programs. All
three Eastern European countries lack
system,

a

a

proper banking

vital element, not only for the economic

infrastructure but also for the provision of credits and for
133

the modernization of Eastern European
companies. So far,
private banks are engaged in Eastern
Europe through the
development of representative offices,
the involvement in
joint venture banks, investments in
the leasing and
insurance market and the training of bank
managers which
provides for a know-how input. But private
banks are opposed
to take over the responsibility in
financing the necessary
economic reforms. In this context. Eastern
Europe needs to

address international financial institutions
and western

governments

.—

7

Tourism functioned as

a

booming sector in the economic

progress of Spain and Portugal. An adequate tourist

infrastructure already exists only in some parts in Eastern
Europe

(Budapest,

the Balaton region, Prague)

Eastern Europe might not evolve into
tourism, the region undoubtedly has

attractiveness

.

target for mass

a
a

Although

.

sufficient

Cultural ties of former refugees, now living

in western Europe,

and the restricted travel opportunities

during communist rule produce an interest and

a

curiosity

for visiting the region.

Tourism offers open space for investment. Apart from
the economic benefits, the Iberian societies were exposed to

western lifestyles prior to the departure from authoritarian
rule which helped pave the road for the democratic

transition
241 / see: Klaus Schroeder,

1991,
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Tourism and therefore also western culture
had a
significant impact on Eastern Europe. As far as they

could

penetrate the iron curtain, the general confrontation
with
western lifestyles and behavior and the display of
wealth

exposed the economic and materialistic weaknesses of the
communist system. Capitalism and western culture set

a

normative standard, whilst the realization of this material
dream represented one cause to start the revolutionary

transformation
It

remains arguable if this cultural exposure should be

regarded as

a

positive experience, but in Spain and Portugal

it undoubtedly represented a break with the authoritarian

past and an integration within the western world.
So far,

western companies and entrepreneurs seek their

chances in opening businesses in Eastern Europe. Four

decades of

a

state-run economy left plenty of consumer

niches for investment. As of October 1992, U.S. estimates
account for 300 U.S. businesses operating in

Czechoslovakia.— Between September 1991 and April 1992,
7

total U.S. investment in Czechoslovakia amounted to US$ 1.3

billion.—' In Hungary, foreign investment of US$ 1.5
7

billion poured into the country in 1991.— Various
investment opportunities and an expanding market attract
242 / New York Times,

October 21,

243 / New York Times,

June 21,

244 / New York Times,

May 03,

1992,

1992,
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foreign money. Still, market capitalism
and investment are
often hampered and even distracted by an
inefficient
bureaucracy and sometimes confusing legal
restrictions and

obligations

On the governmental level,

apart from financial

assistance, the western world can offer inexpensive
help

-

advice. The experience of the "Treuhandanstalt " in
Germany

with the unification process in terms of privatization
can
be of high importance to Eastern Europe. Furthermore
it

would involve highly qualified western expertise. Western
countries can advise Eastern Europe in establishing an
adequate and functioning administration, especially in the

public sector. Western governments can also foster

a

proper

economic climate by giving export guarantees and by granting
tax benefits to companies investing in Eastern Europe.
As Joseph Pozsgai—'

Czechoslovakia, deserve
debts.

7

suggested, Hungary, but also

a

restructuring of their foreign

It seems rather cynical that new regimes,

devoted to

human rights, democracy and market economy have to take over
the debts inherited by communist dictatorship. In this
context,

The Polish effort for a redefinition has succeeded.

The foreign debtors remitted 50 per cent, the United States

even 70 per cent of the Polish debt in March 1991 .—' Debt
245 / Joseph Pozsgai,

1991,

p.123

246 / see: Klaus Schroeder,

1991,
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p.327

rescheduling and remission for
Hungary and Poland remains
to
be done

According to Klaus Schroeder,
the total volume of debt
will rise significantly. At
the end of 1995, Czechoslovakia
would have to pay US? 1.1 billion,
Poland US? 4 billion and
Hungary US$ 2.5 billion.^ Pozsgai
therefore suggests
that Eastern Europe should be
granted a moratorium on
repayment of five to seven years, to
concentrate all
economic forces on the privatization-^
which represents
the biggest obstacle to economic
progress.
So far,

individual countries seem rather
reluctant in
their financial support. The United
States for instance did
not provide any economic or development
assistance
in the

fiscal years of 1990 and 1991 through its
"Agency of

International Development". In September 1991,
the "U.S
Information Agency" and "AID" announced an US$ 18
million

program involving 32 colleges with the aim of training
faculty in management and market economics. An additional
US $ 45 million was invested in a program by the
American

business and private sector .112/ it seems that the

247 / in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.334
Schroeder added all aggregate capital transfers -either
planned or already in progress- of international
financial organizations and western governments. His
estimate is based on the current interest rates.
248 / Joseph Pozsgai,

1991,

p.123

249 / U.S Department of State Dispatch:
September 2, 1991, p.662; April
137

8,

1991,

p.247

individual countries follow

policy of rendering the
responsibility to supra-national
organizations such
a

as the
the World Bank or the European
Community,
this
context, no data on bilateral
cooperations was available.
IMF,

m

On the supra-national level,
the IMF provides extensive
funds to its new members of Eastern
Europe. In addition, the
World Bank also launched credit
programs .121' The European

Community however has to fulfill the
most important part in
improving the Eastern European economies.
For the fostering
of the economic progress, a close
cooperation with Eastern
Europe is essential. No other model provides
such economic
prosperity than the EC. The Community has the
experience,

expertise, as well as the institutions for

dialogue and
It is the

a

a

political

closer cooperation on the governmental level.

"world's greatest trading power and the world's

most generous provider for development aid"

.-^l 7

For Spain and Portugal, the accession into the EC

represented the strongest and most effective link of their
European connection". Would, however an accession of

Eastern Europe achieve the same merits -democratic

250./

The IMF-agreements are scheduled for 1992 until 1994.
Within this period Poland receives US$ 2.5 billion,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia US$ 1.8 billion.
The World Bank plans a US$ 10 billion credit limit for
the entire region; in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.332

251

Werner Ungerer,

/

1990,

p.227
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integration and economic recovery- as it did
for the Iberian
nations?
The Community finds itself in a crisis
with crumpling

currencies, economic setbacks and public
opposition in

several member states against the unification
process. In
terms of an accession of Eastern Europe, two
opposing

attitudes collide: "intensification" versus

enlargement

.

The prospects of a new European order

are within two extremes. On one side a highly integrated
EC
of twelve,

with a hegemonic position over the rest of Europe

and on the other side

a

greater EC, almost identical with

the European CSCE members
The accession question is not limited to the Eastern

European countries. The already submitted applications of
Malta,

Cyprus,

Turkey, Austria,

Switzerland,

Finland must also be taken into account

.

Sweden and

An enlargement of

the EC would then mean at least 22 members.

Under these circumstances it is extremely doubtful

whether the envisaged goal of

a

achieved.— The development of
7

European Union can be
a

common foreign policy,

common military policy and common currency as set forth by
the "Maastricht-treaty " would be hard to accomplish. A

greater EC of 22 members will hardly go beyond the

integration level of an enlarged free trade area. The
252 / see: Gerhard Wettig,

253 / see: Heinz Kramer,

1992,

1992,

p.236

p.13
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additional costs for an extension might
also strain the
countries' budget and might therefore result
in a negative
response among the people towards the concept
of Europe

in

general
On the other side,

an intensification of the Community

of the "Twelve" would prolong the division
of Europe. Such a

denial of an accession for Eastern Europe would
leave the

possibility of an emergence of

a

zone of instability which

can be neither in the European security nor in its
economic

interest. To face the current challenges the EC therefore
is
in need of a fundamental change. As a compromise,

a

proposal

by Heinz Kramer from the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik"
in Germany calls for a

"European system of varying integrated circles", ...
where ... "economically weaker states could be
incorporated into internal market integration via
catching-up models designed in analogy to the envisaged
EMU-EC, without having to fully fulfill their
functional criteria.— 7

With the establishment of the core European Monetary Union,
the EC would represent the most integrated circle, which

could then be followed with

a

similar differentiation and

varying membership circles towards

a

political union. This

could account for a relatively early, although limited

incorporation of Eastern Europe.

254 / Heinz Kramer,

1992,

p.19
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Whatever the future direction of the
EC will be, the
Community has to clarify its position.
A 12-member European

intensification and

broad European integration process
are
irreconcilable under the current concept of
a European
Union. However,

a

a

very close cooperation and integration
is

vital for Eastern Europe. "Go West" is
the only solution for
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Their
economies cannot
develop by relying mainly on internal trade among
the three
or with the republics of the former Soviet
Union or with

other former members of the defunct WTO. All of
these

countries are themselves confronted with enormous
problems.
They are not in the position to provide an economic
boost.

The Community has to take over or at least share the

responsibility. It is the most decisive force on which

economic prosperity and thus

a

political stabilization is

dependent on
So far,

the association agreements

(also called

"European agreements"), negotiated in early 1992 with
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia illustrate the EC's

dilemma in choosing between "intensification" or
"enlargement". The treaties represent

these two poles. The question of

a

a

middle way between

subsequent membership is

deliberately kept open. Priority is given to "efforts to
promote the integration of these countries into the westernstyle international economic and political system"
255 / Heinz Kramer,

1992,

p.14
141

/

The

EC will remove trade barriers to
give access for Eastern
European industrial goods. But restrictions
in the

agricultural sector and for sensitive
industrial goods
(textiles, iron, steel and coal) undermine
this generous
effort.

The treaty further mentions technical

assistance, training and education, the
promotion of
scientific research and technological development;
measures
designed to support structural change.— The
efforts by
7

the EC show

a

remarkable ambition to help and integrate

Eastern Europe. But this current willingness has
to be

transformed into

a

long-term cooperation to overcome the

economic problems.
Here,

a

look at past experiences seems appropriate. In

Spain negotiations for accession were almost in vain, for
the new regime did not manage to incorporate the military
into the democratic society. Apart from the loss of an

ideological base, economic and material aspects accounted
for a number of coups.

The European Community was initially reluctant to

support the new Spanish democracy. With negotiations for an

accession virtually deadlocked, Spain questioned its future
and position within Europe. The military was opposed to the

256 / see: Heinz Kramer,

1992,

p.15

257 / In addition the "European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development" provides credit of approx. US$ 16 billion
(1992 to 1999) in: Klaus Schroeder, 1992, p.333.
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"westernization" of society, while the
government and the
people threw doubt upon the necessity of
NATO
for Spain

It was not until the

meetings in Dublin in 1984, nine

years after Franco's death, that the
community gave a strong
sign of support with the prospect of
accession. In this
period, the European commitment to integrate
Spain was
vague. It resulted in various internal crises.
The situation in Eastern Europe has similar
potentials.
The region needs a democratic anchor, needs
assistance and

guidance. A lack of support, a delay of the integration

process into Europe and

a

struggling economy can severely

test the patience of a country in terms of the acceptance
of
the political and economic systems.
In this context,

accession by acting as

the EC should bridge the period of
a

chairman of emergency, and create

fund designed for guick assistance

The years of regime

crises and coups in Spain in the early 1980

's

showed that

determined action by outside powers is necessary to prevent
a

surrender of the new members of the free world to

despotism and authoritarianism.

258 / Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.335
This "Stability Fund for Europe" should be set up by
the European Bank for Recovery and Development"
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Rejection of Capitalism and Ap a thy towards
Democr^y
The current rejection of Capitalism
and

the apathy

towards the democratization process in
Eastern Europe are
clear signs that people are disappointed
over the

outcome,

especially their own personal, political and
material
benefits of the revolutions. Rejection and
apathy are
negative and almost nihilistic attitudes. The
optimistic
spirit of the revolutionary days changed into
passivity. The
benefits of the new economic and political concepts
differ
widely from the people's expectations at the outset
of the

revolutions. These tendencies ultimately threaten the
new
regimes. They will increase with economic failure, and

political surrender of democracy becomes more likely.
The success story of West —Germany

'

s

departure from the

Nazi-dictatorship offers an appropriate example. The
economic prosperity represented the backbone of the new
German democracy. Broad parts of society benefited from
Capitalism. Although the completion of the economic miracle

took fifteen years, a positive perception of the economic

performance existed from the early 1950

's

on.

"Things are

looking up" was the motto of the post war era and

transformed into

a

solid acceptance of democracy. The

individual's economic benefits provided for an approval of
the organizing principles of society: Democracy and

144

Capitalism .—

in West-Germany

performances had

a

,

positive economic

powerful impact on the establishment
and

the approval of democracy.
It

takes time to turn people, used to
authoritarian

rule for four decades,

into citizens who approve the

transformation and who are convinced that Democracy
and
Capitalism serve their needs best. The case of
Portugal
shows that apathy, the glorification of the
past and

traditional,

authoritarian modes of behavior serve as

a

hotbed for populist movements and anti-democratic
notions.
But Portugal also showed that these tensions decrease
with

a

positive economic performance that grants economic benefits
to the citizens.

Economic prosperity is not an exclusive guarantor of

democracy but it undoubtedly fosters its establishment.

Capitalism and Democracy are intertwined. A democratic
political system can rely on public support, when it
produces economic prosperity and provides for

a

wide

distribution of wealth to broad parts of society.
The public approval of Capitalism and Democracy is so
far limited in Eastern Europe. The task is to legitimize

259 / This material orientation in establishing a new society
culminated in an identity crisis in the late 1960 's.
Intellectuals as well as the Student revolts of 1968
criticized the exclusiveness of the new materialistic
cognitive base, which limited the confrontation with
the Nazi-past and prevented the transformation of the
authoritarian German character into democratic values

and attitudes.
145

——
them,

in order to wipe away
possible intentions to
a return
to authoritarian forms
of government. This
task oannot be

*

-gary

and Csechoslovakta aione.
asks for help and cooperation.
For decades, the European
continent was divided into two
spheres. History offered
the
people of Europe a unique
chance: to unite not only
Germany,
but the whole of Europe.
A close cooperation,
financial and
personal assistance and an
economic integration within
the
established capitalist economies
of Europe are just the
first steps, but they are
essential to achieve this goal.

-3_i

-

*

Et hnonat ionalism

As illustrated by the Spanish
case,

arrangements which grant

a

institutional

decent amount of autonomy are one

way to ease tensions. But political
violence still is a
severe problem for the country, in
addition, cooperation
served as a further means to reduce the
threat to the

Spanish democracy.
Here,

the institutions of the EC are ill-equipped.
The

EC represents an arena for consultation
and political

dialogue on the highest governmental levels.
Although the

Maastricht-treaty calls for
cooperation,

a

its institutions,

increased anti-terrorist
however,

lack the authority

to manage rising ethnic tensions or conflicts
in Eastern

Europe
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The same applies to NATO. Its
task is the provision of
a broad security agenda and
does not address solutions
for

regional problems. The need for a
new security organization
becomes apparent, when looking at the
current security
threats to Europe which show hardly
any resemblance to the
threats that NATO was confronted with in
its founding days.
Here a proposal by Gregory Flynn and
David Scheffer for
a further development of the CSCE
seems appropriate 15°'.
The CSCE includes all members of NATO,
the defunct Warsaw
Pact and most of Europe's neutrals. Until
recently, the CSCE
was limited to meetings on security, economic
and human
rights issues .—7 According to Flynn and Scheffer,
the

CSCE has to gain more power and influence through
the

creation of

a

secretariat and its own peace keeping forces.

The CSCE would provide an intergovernmental forum
with

specific councils which have the ability to address specific
issues,

related to the region's problems, that cannot be

covered by the overarching NATO-structure

.

Councils would

include cooperation on military and environmental issues as
well as on ethnic affairs.
Also, the recent establishment of the new Conflict

Prevention Center has

a

high potency. The Center's current

focus is on a limited range of military matters,

such as

information on military forces and their activities, and
260 / Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer,
261 / Jenonne Walker,

1991,

p.137
147

1990,

p.77-101

military budgets. But it could broaden
its agenda by
addressing internal practices or the
treatment of minorities
which might threaten the peace, thus
urging moderation and
communication.^' An additional proposal
envisages the
Center as an arena for politico-military
security matters,
with arms control and disarmament measures .111/
Furthermore, the organization would not
undermine NATO
-the Alliance would still be regarded as the
"bedrock of

Western security"^ and

a

new CSCE would provide

a

framework to integrate the former Soviet republics
and to
absorb Germany. Finally, as a voting member in the
CSCE,

the

United States would be directly involved in finding
solutions for the regions. Due to the paramount significance
of an economic recovery,

the main task of reducing the

internal threats to democracy has to be fulfilled by

European nations, for Europe is equipped with the most
suitable institution, the EC. But Europe would be foolish to
renounce

a U.S.

American assistance and cooperation.

Knowledge, technological and economic capabilities and

a

long experience in fostering European democracies can do no

harm to the democratization process in Eastern Europe. CSCE
would provide such an arena for the contribution of the

United States.
262 / Jenonne Walker,

1991,

263 / Michael Alexander,

p.139

1991,

p.12

264 / Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer,
148

1990,

p.95

——External

Threats

Due to the absence of
external threats, the
Iberian
do not offer any
suggestions. The external
threats in
Eastern Europe are related
to the unstable and
so far

unpredictable development
processes in the new republics
of
the former Soviet Union
and in the bordering
countries of
the former allies of the
Warsaw pact.
Some scholars have suggested
that NATO should not be
tempted
to get involved in Eastern
Europe. "Bringing East
European
states under at least the Alliance's
political umbrella,
would isolate Moscow,
making Europe less secure in
the
long run
.

.

.

But the integration of the
former Soviet republics
within the CSCE limits the prospect
of isolation, in case
NATO focuses on Eastern Europe.
Instead, various security
matters have to be handled by the CSCE,
which still has the
potency to evolve as a framework for
integrating Russia and
the republics into a European security.
Second, the various

democratization processes in the former USSR
are as yet
incomplete, whereas Eastern Europe had
undergone significant
personal,

ideological and constitutional changes. It should
be essential for the free world to secure
and safeguard

their development.
Therefore, the only solution to close this security
gap
is NATO.

The Alliance is needed as a stabilizing factor in

265 / Jenonne Walker,

1991,

p.134
149

the region.
a

would further provide the United States
with
role as "arbiter and balancing power" .Iff/
NATO is
It

an

essential forum for political consultation and
currently the
only body in which the United States as well as
Canada sit
down alongside with European countries. Its military

capability is still

a

crucial contribution to the European

security. The existing institutions in Europe are themselves
too weak to guarantee a stable security. The recent example
of Yugoslavia indicates that neither the CSCE nor the

European Community had the capability to control the crisis.
The situation in Russia is highly unpredictable.

Although the country is pursuing the path towards democracy,
the process is far from being secure. Changes in the regime

type and the political system are still possible and need to
be taken in account when referring to a proper Eastern

European security. The CSCE therefore cannot function as
substitute for NATO,

a

since Russia has a veto over CSCE

actions
The Maastricht-treaty

its rejection by a Danish

,

referendum and the close public referendum in France showed
that the shape and timing of

a

European unity are still

uncertain. In this context, the role of the Western European

Union (WEU) needs further clarification. The Maastricht-

treaty calls for
266/

a

European defense system that is separated

Henry Kissinger,

267/ Jenonne Walker,

1992,
1991,

p.19
p.140
150

but still "linked" to NATO and open to
all members to the EC
as an expanded version of the WEU.-^7
Also, France and
Germany announced the formation of an operational
corps of

35.000 men by 1995 and asked the members of the
WEU to
join

.—

7

It seems essential for Europe to create its
own defense

system that will eventually succeed Nato as the safeguard
for European security

.

Europe has to take over more

responsibilities in light of its gradual evolution into an
economic super power and due to

possible withdrawal of

a

American troops. However, only confusion exists over the
various proposals and initiatives. So far, Europe remains
incapable of closing the security gap. The Gulf War in 1991
showed the inadequate response of Europe. Thus, European
action on security as well as the development of

a

defence

identity are so far limited.—7
Furthermore, united Germany emerged as

a

continental

political and economic superpower. France and Great Britain
are both too weak to stop an eventual expansion of German

nationalism over Europe and especially over its eastern
part. As Henry Kissinger noted,
strong,

"Germany has become so

that existing European institutions cannot by

268 / in: Washington Post,

December 11, 1991, p.A30

269 / in: New York Times, May 23,

270/ see: Michael Alexander,

1992,

1991,
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p.13

p.Al

themselves establish
partners"

a

balance between Germany
and its

.122/

NATO is also needed to
provide Eastern Europe with
a
guarantee against other external
threats that might evolve
from the unstable situation in
Byelorussia,
the Ukraine,

Lithuania, Russia and Romania.
Only NATO would give
reasonable answers to these security
questions. As discussed
in chapter V.A. a full
incorporation of the Eastern European
militaries is not applicable. But this
does not exclude the
possibility that NATO should give
Eastern Europe a security
guarantee, while border violations
should be judged as a
challenge to western security.
Lately,

the Alliance took a more active
position in

responding to the vital political changes.
Together with
five members from the former Warsaw Bloc
and with

eight of

the fifteen former Soviet republics, NATO
founded the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. It
functions

mainly as

a

forum at the level of foreign ministers to

discuss military reductions and to coordinate security

policies between the states as

a

means of creating greater

stability
Also,

NATO agreed to take over a peace-keeping role in

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 222/ But its
271 / Henry Kissinger,

1992,

p.19

272 / see: New York Times,

June 06,

1991,

p.A5

273 / see: New York Times,

June 05,

1992,

p.l
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commitment is limited. First,
NATO will only take
action
when asked to do so by the
CSCE. But with a veto
power by
Russia, emerging security
threats caused by Moscow
would not
be covered. Second, a complete
security guarantee would have
a preventive-deterrent
element,
its communique

m

however,

NATO is only willing to counteract
security threats on
case-by-case basis.

a

In search of a new role in
the aftermath of the cold

war,

NATO took a small step towards

a

readjustment of its

European security concept. From the
ideological

confrontation of two opposing state societies,
it narrowed
its focus to a particular region and
probably

to individual

states that are not directly integrated within
its
structure. With its enemy the Warsaw Pact gone,
the

safeguarding of the East-European democratization
processes
can serve as a new function for the Alliance.
In addition,

NATO accounts for the involvement of the

United States in the democratic transformation of the
Eastern European countries. Through NATO the U.S. can
provide some assurance against any eventual expansionism
from the republics of the former Soviet Union. The role of

NATO is crucial. The Alliance must help in keeping the level
of external threats as low as possible. This reduction of

external pressure would in return decrease internal

tensions

.

With

a

supportive NATO, Poland, Hungary and

Czechoslovakia need not enlarge their militaries and would
153

enable them to direct more
resources towards internal
problems
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